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Preface
This paper was written for use in the Namibia High-Level 
Workshop on Transnational Corporations organised by the 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
in Brazzaville in September 1983. Most of the examples 
cited are from Southern Africa and the country for which 
specific issues, alternatives and approaches are reviewed in 
context is Namibia.
The reasons why TNCs are interested in host countries, and 
why host countries want TNCs are by no means unique to the 
countries of Southern Africa. Nor are the tensions which 
such interests give rise to. They affect almost all low and 
lower middle income economies involved in such 
relationships. Negotiations in which the co-authors have 
taken part, as well as records of how other agreements were 
reached and discussions with participants, have made it 
clear that the main fiscal and financial issues are often 
neither fully understood nor adequately explored. There is 
often lack of a clear understanding also concerning the 
nature of the negotiating process necessary to reach stable 
agreements. In this respect officials of the host state and 
officers of the TNCs often appear to share similar 
limitations in perspective and approach.
While this study was originally written for use at the 
Workshop by officials of the South West African People's 
Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, it touches upon problems 
and issues - such as how to create room for manoeuvre and
how to define the best attainable results - which confront
both state and TNC officials in other developing countries. 
The report serves as an introduction to the subject for 
officials and political decision-takers who have not 
specialised in economics, corporate analysis, fiscal policy 
or the theory and practice of negotiation. For those who 
have engaged in some negotiations already it may prove
helpful as a fresh review and a checklist.
Because of this wider potential readership this monograph is 
being reprinted in the IDS Commissioned Study series. Tha 
analysis, comments and conclusions presented here, however, 
are the sole responsibility of the co-authors and do not
necessarily correspond with those of SWAPO or the UNCTC, or 
the IDS.
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Summary
This study explores some of the fiscal and financial issues 
which are raised by, and influence, the relationship between 
host states and transnational corporations. The
accommodations reached - usually through negotiation - go a 
long way toward determining the viability of the TNC unit 
and its contribution to the host economy. Following an 
introductory survey, separate chapters explore these fiscal 
and financial issues from the different perspectives of 
TNCs, and of host governments. The negotiating process
through which such arrangements are determined is the next
topic of scrutiny. While Chapter 5 looks specifically at 
taxation and participation options in Namibia it also
illustrates possibilities and trade-offs which are 
applicable to other small developing countries. The 
concluding chapter summarises the fiscal and financial 
aspects of negotiations with TNCs from a state perspective.
(iv)
TNC-STATE RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS: 
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES
Chapter One
AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
This study is intended to pose some of the fiscal and 
financial issues which are relevant to determining state 
policy in respect to, and negotiations with, TNCs. It is 
not a comprehensive guide to all such issues nor does it 
cover in any depth the broader range of topics beyond 
fiscal and financial relevant to state-TNC relationships.
Examples cited are in large part chosen from Southern 
African to increase their relevance to the context likely to 
be faced by Namibia on independence. However, neither the 
particular issues in any one case, the situation at any one 
time or the context of any one country (or TNC) is ever 
replicated exactly so that carbon copies of solutions - 
however satisfactory in their own terms - are unlikely to 
prove either feasible or desirable.
Why States Want TNCs
In simple terms a state will want a TNC to establish or 
expand its activities within the state's territory if the 
TNC's operations will help to achieve a public objective 
which could not be achieved in its absence or could only be 
achieved less competently or at a much higher cost. Public 
objective in this sense means an objective significant to 
some group to which the state's decision takers are
responsible or responsive. Who such groups are will vary 
with the nature of the state.
Among the most likely objectives are tax revenue, exports,
profits for domestic partners (state or private) and
supplies, knowledge (including technology), personpower 
development. Why a TNC may be necessary or useful to 
achieving these ends depends on the specific case. It may 
be able to spread or accept r isk whereas the state could 
not, eg the survey and exploration of the Etosha Basin's 
hydrocarbon potential may well cost over $250 mn before 
commercial deposits are proven to exist or to be absent. 
For TNCs with explorations in many areas the wins and losses 
even out, for Namibia it is much nearer to a flip of the
coin gamble. Cost may be beyond national capacity to 
raise; eg the Langer Heinrich uranium/uranium oxide project
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may cost over $1,500 mn to complete. A TNC may be the only 
practicable source of management and professional expertise: 
eg it is fairly easy to build or acquire commercial bank 
premises but quite another matter to train or recruit 
personnel to run a bank effectively - especially if many of 
them, at least initially, need to be expatriates.
Technology may be held almost totally by a few TNCs, eg if 
the Oranjemund delta natural gas is to be brought to shore 
and turned into ammonia-urea a series of complex 
technologies must be used, and used properly. Most of those 
possessing this knowledge and ability to use it are TNCs.
Clearly, TNCs are not the only possible ways around the
constraints listed. * In each case there may be other ways to
spread risk, raise external finance, train or hire 
personnel, procure knowledge. Even if a TNC is needed, it 
may be practicable to enter into a contractual relationship 
not involving majority - or even any - TNC participation in 
ownership. However, in some cases, even when alternatives
are canvassed, TNCs will emerge as either the only realistic 
alternative or the least costly/most efficient one from the 
state's point of view.
However, that a TNC is needed at one point in time does not 
mean that it will be needed forever. One goal of 
negotiation should be to build in increases in national
capacity to supply those elements whose initial absence
made the TNCs presence critical. Clearly such built in
'fade out' is not a TNC goal so that achieving and enforcing 
such arrangements is usually an area of considerable 
tension.
A point relating both to alternatives and to change over 
time is that of 'opportunity cost' or priorities and 
sequences. A state with a few highly qualified and 
experienced personnel, fully trusted expatriate
professionals, institutional capacity, knowledge and finance 
cannot do everything it wishes to do immediately. 
Dispersing its resources too thinly may result in near 
total lack of success in any direction. Therefore, it may 
wish to concentrate them on a limited number of key 
activities (including enterprises) and consolidate these 
while building up resources to expand its role over time. 
Thus, in 1977 when Tanzania nationalised a wide range of 
enterprises it concentrated citizen personnel and direct 
operating attention on two sectors - finance and sisal. The 
remainder were initially handled via management contracts. 
Over time, as experience and available personnel grew, these 
were gradually phased out so that virtually none remain 
today.
What TNCs Want
TNC goals can be summed up under three headings: survival,
profitability and expansion. Evidently the three are
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interrelated. Without survival, there will be no profits. 
Without opportunities for new profitable investment 
(expansion) , the TNC will not be very well regarded by 
investors or managers. However, there are also tradeoffs: 
very high short term profits based on low wages and 
transfer pricing to hide the true profits from the state 
may imperil medium term survival and - once that TNC 
establishes a reputation for such policies - limit the 
number of countries which will welcome new investment by it. 
A rational TNC balances all three goals - it does not seek 
to maximise one to the exclusion of the others.
However, what is true for a TNC as a whole need not apply to 
each of its units. In particular, TNC logic requires that 
expansion be in the potentially most profitable (and 
survivable) opportunities which often implies moving profits 
out of the country where they are earned. This is 
particularly true of mining companies. Equally the 
survival and profitability of the group may be enhanced by 
abandoning (or selling) a subsidiary with poor profit 
prospects or life expectancy. However, it remains true that 
TNCs will not establish new enterprises unless they can 
reasonably expect substantial profits relative to assets at 
risk and a fair certainty that the enterprise can survive 
long enough to earn them. Similarly in renegotiation the 
preservation of at least part of an existing profit flow and 
the creation of a new context in which survival for a
substantial period is assured is normally a TNC's primary 
concern.
This is not to say that TNCs pay no attention to national 
and international social, legal and political contexts. 
They certainly do, because ignoring them creates risks to 
survival, to the profitability of existing ventures and the
acceptability of new or expanded operations. TNCs seem to
vary markedly on how sensitive they are to such contextual
issues, and on how long a time horizon they operate with.
However, TNCs' response to such contexts does not require 
'equity' or 'good citizenship' to be any part of their own 
logic or 'corporate morality'. It flows directly from the 
fact that the concepts of morality, equity and 'acceptable 
corporate behaviour' that exist in individual countries and 
internationally do, in part, determine what it is necessary 
and/or prudent to do to ensure survival, profitability and 
expansion.
TNCs do - in varying degrees - have standards of business 
ethics. It is too cynical to say these are simply what they 
think they can "get away with" although that often seems to 
be a substantial component. One other component is 
certainty - contracts and other arrangements based on 
outright lies, bribes or intent to default on basic 
obligations do give rise to uncertainty. Therefore, beyond 
a certain point TNCs usually prefer to avoid such practices
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(and certainly to ensure that nobody practises them on 
them). However, in negotiating with weak, badly informed 
states TNCs frequently do make use of bribes, suppression of 
information and use of language suggesting that they are 
promising more than they actually are. Faith in business 
morality is usually a very weak tool in negotiations unless 
one has the knowledge and negotiating skill to make it clear 
that adhering to fairly strict standards is clearly good 
business.
Fiscal and Financial Issues
The primary fiscal/financial issue is how to divide up the 
total surplus (or operating profit) of the enterprise. This 
is ultimately a question first of shares, and second of 
devising methods of division which do not radically reduce 
the total to be divided. Thus one objection to high mineral 
royalties is that by deterring exploitation of low grade 
ores they ultimately reduce total profit and, therefore, 
reduce the TNC's share by more than they increase the 
state's (and in extreme cases may reduce the total state
take) . For this purpose the overall result is usually much 
more important than the particular tax and ownership means 
used to achieve it.
However, profit share is not purely a matter of state 
receipts. A high wage and salary policy reduces TNC
receipts (and government direct revenue) to the advantage of 
a particular group of citizens. Similarly, tight exchange 
control on remittance of fees and dividends will
significantly reduce the real value of profits to a TNC
which wants to use them to pay dividends to its own
shareholders or to invest outside the country in which the 
profits are earned.
Further, there are 'side benefits' beyond direct enterprise 
surpluses. For a country these may include employment, 
markets for local products, provision of multi-purpose
infrastructure, foreign exchange earnings, etc. They may 
also accrue to a TNC. For example de Beers' basic interest 
in Williamson's Diamonds (Tanzania) is not really its profit 
share, but rather lies in maintaining the Central Selling 
Organisation's role in marketing the output. And in Namibia 
the Otjihase copper mine was worth more to the Tsumeb base 
metal mining and smelting group than to any other owner 
because Tsumeb could make a profit smelting Otjihase ore, a 
point of no value to any other owner. It is worth 
identifying 'side benefits' when engagedin negotiation or 
renegotiation. Indeed, at times, it may be worth trading 
off direct fiscal and financial gains for side benefits if 
it is possible to ensure that the latter will be provided.
The inverse of 'side benefits' is 'related costs'. The most 
common one is infrastructure that TNCs insist the government
provide. In the case of substantial infrastructure required 
primarily for a specific enterprise, it is critical to treat 
its fiscal/financial cost as an offset to gains from the 
enterprise proper. It is also critical to ensure that such 
infrastructural investment can in cases like water and power 
sell its products to the enterprise at commercially viable 
rates. A blatant example of failure to ensure this is the 
power supply contract between Ghana and Valeo (an aluminium 
smelter basically owned by Kaiser) whose rate, set over 20 
years ago with no provision for adjustment, is now grossly 
uneconomic.
Negotiation and Renegotiation: Purposes and Constraints
Negotiation is a process intended to determine whether an 
agreement meeting each party's minimum requirements can be 
reached. Unless several TNCs are competing for the same 
involvement and the state has unusually good access to 
information, plus analytical and negotiating talent, it 
tends to be a situation in which, objectively, the TNC is at 
an advantage.
The purpose of negotiation from the state side is to secure 
its minimum targets (including fiscal and financial ones) 
and as much more as is consistent with the TNC (or some 
alternative partner) coming in at all. An agreement which 
does not achieve the minimum (and they are not unknown) is, 
in fact, a more perverse result than a breakdown of 
negotiations.
Renegotiation is somewhat -though far from totally 
different. It may be provided for in the initial
arrangements with the TNC. There is indeed much to be said 
for periodic renegotiations especially when very substantial 
uncertainties as to the level and timing of future profits 
are unavoidable at the time of the initial negotiations. It 
may also arise from a contextual change neither party
anticipated, eg in the mid-1970s Shell/BP insisted on
renegotiating their joint venture agreement with Tanzania 
because the cost of 90 days interest free credit on crude 
and product imports had risen explosively. Tanzania, in
response, insisted on also ending Shell/BP's right to be the 
sole supplier of imported crude and products to the joint 
venture. Similarly the past history of a TNC and the
arrangements (and profits) it has made may give cause for - 
and general acceptance of the validity of - renegotiations. 
The advent of independence has often led (sometimes with a 
few years' time lag) to such renegotiations, as have very 
high TNC profits compared to averages for TNCs as a whole or 
for that sector.
Renegotiation is coming to be seen - by TNCs as well as 
states -to be necessary, not antithetical, to continuing 
relationships. Contexts change, the future is
unpredictable, 1983's apparently satisfactory agreement may 
look very inequitable or unsound indeed by 1990. Therefore, 
setting up built-in review and renegotiation mechanisms 
(open to both parties) is attracting more attention in 
state-TNC initial negotiations. Ruling them out is
increasingly viewed as rather like tying down the safety 
valve on a steam boiler. In renegotiation the state usually 
has a stronger position than in the initial negotiation. It 
knows more about the enterprise and the total surplus to be 
divided and the TNC has substantial sunk costs (eg fixed 
assets) in the host state. But this is not always the case: 
if a TNC is genuinely losing money on a venture and the 
state has major employment, foreign exchange, regional or 
use of infrastructure reasons for wishing continued 
operation, then theTNC's position in renegotiations is 
strong, and that of the state correspondingly weaker.
State Participation in Enterprise Ownership
States participate in the ownership of enterprises for a 
very broad range of reasons. To increase public sector 
revenue is certainly one, but by no means the dominant one 
in most states or even in respect to each public enterprise 
in any state.
Equally, while a commitment to a transition to socialism 
does - if serious - require a substantial and rising state 
role in ownership of productive assets, very large state 
enterprise sectors characterise many countries - eg Kenya, 
South Africa, India, Brazil - which are not, and do not 
claim to be, committed to creating a socialist economic 
system. Similarly, in any transition to socialism an 
instant change from public to private ownership (even of 
large enterprises) is unlikely to be practicable - both the 
German Democratic Republic and China had substantial 
capitalist industrial sub-sectors for a decade after 
socialist governments came to power. Nor is there any 
necessary incompatibility between a commitment to socialism 
and some joint ventures with TNCs for specific purposes, any 
more than between a commitment to capitalism and a 
substantial number of cases in which the state is the 
national partner with foreign TNCs in joint ventures. This 
is particularly true in Africa, where limited domestic 
resources in respect to knowledge, personnel, institutions 
and finance lead to a need for foreign partners. In respect 
to large business enterprises, the only available partners 
are TNCs or a socialist industrial state's enterprises whose 
role from the African host's point of view may be very 
similar. By the same token, domestic private capitalists 
usually have even less knowledge, personnel, institutional 
base and access to finance than the state or its 
enterprises, so that often the only meaningful national 
partner available is the state.
In respect to those enterprises in which TNC participation 
is likely - eg mining, manufacturing, international and 
wholesale commerce, finance; as opposed to electric power, 
railways and other public utilities - the basic case for 
state participation usually turns at least as much on 
acquiring detailed knowledge of and control over what the 
company is doing in respect to output, expansion, employment 
(including training) and similar issues as to public sector 
revenue proper. Certainly dividends are one way of securing 
a profit share, but if that is the only concern various 
other approaches - including sliding scale profits taxes - 
might often serve equally well. However, knowledge and 
control (at least in the sense of positively causing things 
to happen) are usually harder to achieve from outside than 
as a joint owner. That point, of course, cuts two ways - 
TNCs may well be able to influence government policy more 
effectively if there is joint ownership. That explains why 
some TNCs actively seek state participation - indeed on 
occasion majority participation - in proposed new, or even 
existing, enterprises.
The Namibian Context
At present, TNCs are very important in Namibia. This flows 
in large measure from the fact that in normal years, up to 
three quarters of exports and of pre-tax enterprise services 
come from three mining companies: Rossing (RTZ),
Consolidated Diamond Mines (de Beers/Anglo) and Tsumeb 
(Consolidated Gold Fields/Anglo) . It is made more
pervasive by the dominant role of two TNC Banks (Barclays 
and Standard) and of two petroleum products 
importers/distributors (Shell and BP) and the dominant 
karakul export firm (Hudsons Bay). Further, while fishing, 
and meat packing, and construction are technically not TNC 
dominated in the sense that control is largely in the hands 
of large South Africancompanies, from a Namibian point of 
view this is a distinction without a difference. The same 
holds true to a slightly lesser degree for general importing 
and wholesaling and for road motor transport.
The situation in respect to prospective renegotiation is 
partly special and partly genuinely unique. None of the 
TNCs entered Namibia after negotiations with a Namibian 
government - indeed some of the basic arrangements date back 
to the German colonial period. A number of enterprises - 
including the three main mines - have made historic profits 
which it is hard to characterise as other than excessive. 
They have made them, furthermore, within an apartheid and 
quasi forced labour system under a favourable tax regime and 
with low reinvestment ratios. These characteristics alone 
would - in the present climate of world opinion - constitute 
grounds for fairly far-reaching renegotiations.
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The unique factor is that under the 1971 International Court 
of Justice advisory opinion to the United Nations, South 
Africa's presence since the revocation of the Mandate in 
1966 has been unlawful. Therefore any South African-TNC 
arrangements negotiated since 1966 are void ab initio so far 
as the international legal position goes. Thus, m  cases 
such as Rossing and the new meat packing plant complex, the 
situation facing Namibia and the TNCs at independence is one 
of negotiation, not renegotiation, as the South African 
negotiators had no lawful power to negotiate. The situation 
in respect to pre-1966 firms which have continued to do 
business is much less clearcut but, as noted, seems to fall 
in most cases within the parameters of cases in which both 
world legal and commercial opinion accept that substantial 
renegotiation, including fiscal and financial provisions, is 
both inevitable and justifiable.
However, there are limits to the strength of Namibia's 
negotiating position. Continued efficient operation of 
mining, banking, etc, is essential to having a functioning 
economy. At independence there will not be enough trained 
Namibians to achieve that. Therefore either present TNCs, 
new TNCs, expatriate contract managements (without 
ownership) or individual hired expatriate managers and 
professionals will be essential. In some cases the
dislocation costs of sudden replacement of present TNC 
management and personnel would be high. That cost is a 
necessary factor in shaping a Namibian negotiating stance 
even though it may, in some cases, be a cost worth paying.
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Chapter Two
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES: TNC PERCEPTIONS 
Background
A company or corporation consists of a body of people coming 
together for the purpose of conducting trade. The main 
purpose of trade - but not the only purpose, as we shall see 
- is making a profit. Therefore the main purpose of TNCs is 
the generation of profit.
This proposition resides at the heart of our analysis of 
corporate decision-making. It is a central truth. The 
understanding of it, and of its implications, explains the 
conduct of corporate bodies both large and small, explains 
how small companies grow to be large, explains how even 
large companies can fail and can disappear. Yet what a 
multiplicity of motivations that truth conceals! Companies 
consist of men and women. 'Economic man' is not the whole 
man. However massive the corporation and however dry and 
automated its bureaucrats appear, its decisions in any 
particular situation are taken by individual men and women 
who are moved by passion and hope, by fear and by pride.
It is important to remember this. In dealing with a massive 
TNC, we must understand the system which has enabled it to 
grow. We must understand the concatenation of forces that 
constitute itscollective decision-making process; and what, 
within that system, distinguishes a successful from an 
unsuccessful decision. But we must also remember that any 
particular decision is taken by individual men and women, 
and is the product not just of objective facts and cold 
figures, but of personal judgements, personal apprehensions 
and personal ambitions.
The term 'profit' refers loosely to the extent by which the 
revenue from any activity exceeds its costs. But beyond 
this simple description, 'profit' is not a single precise 
concept. The same is true of 'profitability' and 'rates of 
profit'. There are many different ways of measuring these 
concepts, and there may indeed be many different ways of 
arriving at the figures that are to be used in these
different methods of measurement. To give but two
examples.... there is no logically right way, to the 
exclusion of all other ways, of dealing in the accounts with 
the depreciation of a capital asset which lasts for a number 
of years but which, it is expected, will have to be replaced
before the end of the project. Nor is there a single
correct way, in seeking to measure profit, of dealing with 
the phenomenom of inflation.
But if there is no single correct way to measure profit, how 
do businesses and governments arrive at a method of
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measurement - and a set of figures - that both are prepared 
to accept? Sometimes they cannot agree, but more often they 
do. The way in which they do so is two-fold. First, by
agreeing on a set of conventions (or agreed procedures) that 
will be used for deriving the figures and making the
required calculations. Second, either by insisting that a 
company's figures are checked by a firm of independent
auditors or, on occasions where there is serious
controversy, by one side or the other insisting that their 
own accountants should be allowed to examine in detail the 
books and calculations of the other party.
Many people now are familiar with the derogatory epithet 
'creative accounting' - presenting figures to indicate that
a company is doing either much better, or much worse, than
it actually is. What is less well understood is that even 
with the use of acceptable accounting procedures, there is 
still very considerable latitude for companies to shift
profits from one part of the world to another, or from one 
year to another, to lower profits by incorporating 
pessimistic assumptions (for instance about doubtful
debtors) or to increase them by incorporating optimistic 
assumptions (for instance about the value of stocks on 
hand). The question 'What is the true profitability?' turns 
out not to be a valid question with a unique 'true' answer 
because there is no single, universally appropriate measure 
of profit.
The Assessment of Profitability
If there is no single measure of achieved profit, it follows 
that there can be no single way of assessing the likely 
future profitability of a project which has yet to be
brought into being. And that is indeed the case. Methods 
of project appraisal, some very simple some very
sophisticated - contend with each other, with some companies 
using one method and some another. The choice of method
matters. It matters not only to any government that may be 
negotiating the terms of a project with a company, but to
the company as well. It matters to the government because
it cannot properly understand how the company intends to 
operate and what terms for such operations would be 
appropriate, unless it also understands the techniques by 
which the project has been appraised. It matters to the 
company in part perhaps because it seeks to use the 
appraisal to wring the best terms that it can from
government. But more fundamentally, the correct choice of 
projects to invest inis a vital component in overall company 
efficiency and profitability. If the company persistently 
makes wrong choices, it will become unprofitable and fail. 
If that happens the whole value of the company as reflected 
by its share price will fall. Eventually, in the capitalist 
world, it will either be taken over by a more efficient 
company whose managers believe that they can make more
profitable use of the company's assets. Or if it continues
- 10 -
to make losses and no-one takes it over, the company will 
become insolvent in the sense that its debts will exceed the 
value of its assets. It will then be forced to close down, 
and all those who have invested in it will lose their money.
The foregoing discussion opens up another possibility. The 
story of the businessman who keeps one set of books for 
himself and another for the taxman is a very old one. 
Similarly, it should not always be assumed that the cash 
flow projections which a company produces for the purpose of 
negotiating with a host country government are precisely the 
same as those that it employs for making its own internal 
project appraisal. A high degree of technical knowledge and 
experience of the business, and detailed scrutiny of such 
projections will be necessary to determine whether they are 
realistic and should be accepted as a basis for 
negotiations.
The Uses of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis
TNCs make use of DCF analysis in a number of different ways. 
They will wish to see the estimated rate of return on the 
project as a whole before taxes and other payments to
government. They will wish to see the DCF rate of return on 
the project after such payments to government are made.
They will wish to see what the rate of return to equity
holders in the project is likely to be, ie to themselves and 
any other partners who will take up equity holdings. They
will wish to vary the assumptions fed into the analysis,
both on the optimistic side and on the pessimistic side, to 
ascertain the sensitivity of the rate of return to various 
changes that might occur. They will wish to try varying the 
design of the project, or its financing package, to see 
whether it is possible to sweeten its rate of return or
increase its net present value without substantially 
increasing risk or funds deployed.
Most companies have some benchmark rate of return 'target 
figure' which a project has to meet before it will be 
considered for implementation. In fact there will be one 
target figure for IRR on the entire project, and another for 
the internal rate of return (IRR) to be achieved on a firm's 
own equity involvement. It would be false to give the 
impression that these figures are absolutely firm - other 
features of the project will be taken into account in the 
adjustment of such target figures marginally upward or 
downward. Such features may include the size of the
project, the part of the world where it is to be situated,
the sector it is in, the degree of commercial or political 
risk that is thought to be involved, the quality of the 
management available to run the project, the 'up-side' 
potential for the project if demand for the project's 
product proves to be stronger than anticipated, and whether 
the project fits particularly well into the TNC's overall strategy.
Decisions on major investments are made by boards of
directors who will certainly have detailed numerical
appraisals prepared for them which will show whether or not 
a project seems likely to meet minimum stipulated rates of 
return. But these appraisals will not be the sole
determinants of the eventual decision. Apart from the
various DCF rates of return, a typical TNC will also look at 
the maximum financial exposure that will be involved in 
constructing the project, and how that will effect its 
balance sheet. It may even look at the crude 'pay-back'
period, in the sense of wanting to know how long it will
take for the company to recover its investment.
DCF analysis - like any other - produces results no more
accurate than the assumptions and data fed into it. Costs 
and receipts are projections (estimates) and may vary widely 
as to amount and timing. This is especially true of metal 
prices which swing sharply and unpredictably so that DCF for 
a project may be greatly affected by whether production
opens on a price upswing or at the beginning of a downturn 
(eg Bougainville in Papua New Guinea was very fortunate in 
this regard and Otjihase in Namibia most unfortunate). 
Inflation affects most of the future receipts and payments 
and - in a sense - the appropriate 'cutoff' internal rate of 
return. To guard against nasty surprises TNCs increasingly 
run multiple analysis testing for sensitivity to different 
timing and levels of receipts and to varying inflation 
rates.
A TNC's DCF for a project may not be the same as a 
country's. The project may generate net cash flow for TNC 
units outside the host country as sellers of goods or 
services to and/or as processors and marketers of the 
project's output. These are unlikely to be explained to the 
country (which must try to guess for itself as to their 
significance) but do affect the acceptable DCF to the TNC as 
shareholder in the project proper.
An Integrated View
We have identified the making of profit as the main motive 
force for undertaking an investment. That conclusion 
stands. But it needs to be qualified in two ways. It may 
not be the only reason why a TNC makes an investment. And 
the profit of the subsidiary may not be the only source of 
profitability to the investing TNC.
What other motives may influence an investment decision
other than the prospect of profit on the project itself?
There are many. A company in the mining business, for 
instance, may wish to procure access to orebodies to replace 
others that are nearing depletion, to feed smelters within
their own company group or to meet the demand of established
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customers. Some companies are particularly eager to 
diversify the sources of their primary supplies in case 
military or civil disorders, or labour action, jeopardises a 
major portion of them. A company may invest or purchase 
other companies abroad in order to procure assured markets 
for its own exported products. This process is known as 
forward integration. It may want to expand horizontally (ie 
in the same line of business) because it believes that it 
had a technique of manufacture or management strength or an 
improved product that will enable it to capture markets from 
its competitors. Or investment may be defensive, such as 
when a company is obliged to move into some local 
manufacturing of its products in a foreign market to 
forestall some other firm from doing so, which would then 
seek to have the government exclude importation of the 
finished product from the company that had previously held 
the major share of the market. In a broad sense such 
actions are taken to expand, protect or limit losses to 
group profit, but they are consistent with investing in a 
project with an apparently low or negative DCF.
Sources of profit to an investing TNC other than dividends, 
are an aspect that has come to assume increasing importance. 
TNCs have learnt that many host country governments do not 
like to see substantial profits flowing abroad. Therefore, 
rather than receive profits overtly in the form of declared 
dividends, many TNCs now find it discreet and advantageous 
to take their revenue from the project in other forms. The 
modalities are quite numerous, and the methods employed may 
be quite open and legal. Indeed it may suit both host
country government and investing company that revenues 
should be received in this way.
One such way of taking revenue out of a project and of 
recovering the original investment faster than would 
otherwise have been possible is by making use of loans from 
subsidiary and affiliate companies to replace money that
would otherwise have been put in as equity. Interest
payments are treated as a cost to the project, deductible in 
the assessment of taxable income. The payments themselves 
are usually not taxed as income earned within the host
country if they are paid abroad, although they may be
subject to an interest withholding tax. The repayment of 
the capital of the loan is not taxed either. It may 
therefore be an easier way for an investor to recover a part 
of his initial capital than by trying to recover capital
invested as equity, which can normally only be done as long 
as the company is still operating through the receipt of
dividends, which will have been liable to both company
income tax and dividend withholding tax. It is now common 
practice for governments to insist that foreign equity from 
the investing TNC should comprise a certain minimum 
proportion of the value of the investment in a project, and 
that loan finance - particularly locally provided loan 
finance - should be restricted to agreed proportions.
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Fees, commissions, royalty and licensing payments, and 
contributions to head office expenses are other forms of 
payments from the subsidiary company to the investing TNC 
that may comprise a significant proportion of the beneficial 
revenue flows that the TNC receives. They have the 
advantage of not being subject to exchange control to the 
same degree as dividend payments; and, instead of attracting 
host country company taxation, they are treated in the 
subsidiary company accounts as expenses that reduce domestic 
taxable income. The problem with these types of payments is 
that, at appropriate rates, they constitute legitimate 
payments for genuine and important services. But the 
appropriate level of charge is difficult for many developing 
country governments to check. It is for this reason that a 
growing number of countries levy withholding tax on all such 
payments made outside the country, usually at a rate less 
than normal company tax.
To the extent that inter-company (or intra-company) fees, 
commissions, royalty charges, etc. are excessive, they 
constitute a form of transfer pricing. Other forms of
transfer pricing in the sale of equipment and material to 
the subsidiary company, or in the purchase of the product of
the subsidiary company, also constitute a method of
transferring revenue from the investment in a foreign
country to the TNC's own main controlling company, or 
possibly to a subsidiary company established for the purpose 
in an overseas tax haven.
In deciding whether to make an investment in a new project, 
or for that matter in deciding whether to go on operating an 
existing project, a TNC will take an integrated view as to 
how the project fits into its entire corporate strategy. It 
will also make its own assessment, in detail that will not 
be available to the host country government, of all the 
potential sources of revenue that it may expect to receive 
from the project, amongst which the dividends shown as 
payable on the cash flow projections may comprise only one 
important element.
Mining as a Special Case
There are factors which make the design of fiscal regimes 
for mining companies both particularly interesting and 
particualrly difficult. At the root of this difficulty 
resided the fact that, in most developing countries, the 
state is both the owner of the mineral rights and, through 
the government, the central taxing authority. It follows 
from this that the payments that a mining company makes to a 
government compromise, conceptually, two very different 
types of payment. The first type of payment is the 
company's payment for the right to mine - the equivalent, if 
you like, to a purchase of the material that is valuable 
within the orebody, which in turn gives the company the
right to exploit that orebody and to export the mineral. 
The government receives that payment in its role of owner of 
the mineral rights on behalf of the people of the country. 
The second type of payment is the payment that the company 
makes upon its taxable income - and possibly also through 
deductions from the interest and dividends that it pays if 
such taxes apply. The government receives these payments in 
its role as general taxing authority in exchange for the 
security and services which it supplies to all its citizens, 
both individual and corporate.
This distinction between the two types of charge and the two 
types of payment is important because different principles 
determine in each case what the appropriate level of payment 
ought to be. There is no reason why a mining compnay, as a 
corporate citizen, should not be subject broadly to the same 
rules of taxation as apply generally to other companies 
operating within the same tax jurisdiction. Exceptions to 
this general proposition should be few and can be justified 
only by proof that they are to the public benefit. Payments 
for the right to mine and sell the country's irreplaceable 
mineral wealth are subject to quite different principles. 
If we ask, 'What is the right price for the government to 
charge for the sale of the country's minerals?', the answer 
is surely clear. It is the highest price that the 
government can procure from an efficient mining company
while leaving the company just sufficient inducement to 
undertake the mining. On the assumption that the government 
is not in a position to undertake the mining itself - or 
through a management contract - in a manner that will leave 
it with a greater net benefit, the principle stated must be 
correct. Any higher price would leave the deposit unmined; 
any lower price would leave in the hands of the company a 
part of the benefit from the mining (the 'rent element') 
that properly belongs to the people of the country.
A confusion between these two types of charge is often 
compounded because it may suit both the host country
government and the mining TNC to name as 'taxes' some forms
of payment which are in fact more truly payments for use of
the resource.
We have argued that the income tax provisions applicable to 
mining TNCs should, in essence, be the same as those which 
apply to other foreign companies. But what of the basis of 
the charge for mining the orebody? That is a far more 
difficult matter. It is difficult, first, because at the 
time when the mining agreement is signed, which is likely to 
be before the full exploration phase, neither party, and 
certainly not the government, will know precisely what it is 
that is being sold - or the size, location, richness, 
geological and chemical qualities of the orebody, or other 
characteristics about it which will determine the ease and 
profitability with which it can be worked. In other words, 
neither party will know the potential value of the deposit.
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But there is a second cause of difficulty. The prices of 
mineral products are notoriously volatile. It follows that, 
even if the actual quantity and precise costs of production 
of a mineral product could be known in advance, the 
profitability would be unknown; and it is on the 
profitability of future productive activities that the 
present value of the mineral resource depends.
For the government of a developing country, the way to 
resolve this problem of setting an appropriate price for the 
sale of its mineral resources - again assuming that it is 
not possible for the state to mine the resource itself -lies 
in the selection of the right pricing formulae. Progress in 
the evolution and acceptance of new formulae has in recent 
years been rapid. The precise formulae to be imposed or 
negotiated in any particular case are likely to depend upon 
the characteristics of the mineral itself and its marketing 
structure, upon the policy frame of the government, and 
perhaps also on the preference and tax position of the 
company. But it is possible to discuss the properties that 
the pricing formula ought to possess.
Our experience suggests that the right combination of 
charges should demonstrate three distinct properties, which 
will assume differing importance depending upon whether the 
property turns out to be:
(i) a relatively poor and unprofitable mine;
(ii) an averagely profitable mine;
(iii) an exceptionally rich and profitable mine.
The first form of charge or imposition should be related to
production. Under the name of royalties (signifying
payments to the king for use of a resource which was
recognised as being his property) , such payments originally 
took the form of a certain proportion of the actual physical 
production, then a certain fixed payment per ton, and
finally - most commonly - a certain percentage of the value 
of production. It is often urged against 'royalties' that 
they operate as an addition to fixed costs and thus,
theoretically, reduce the size of the orebody by rendering 
marginal parts of it uneconomic to mine. This is in the
interest of neither the resource owner not the operator. 
Such arguments are correct, and are a reason for keeping 
royalties for most types of minerals comparatively low (say
2 \ to 5 per cent of value) and for giving the Minister power
to waive, defer or reduce royalty payments in exceptional
circumstances.
For an orebody of average profitability, it is sensible to
make the major part of the charge a function of profit. 
This can be done by the imposition of a minerals profits tax 
on top of the ordinary company income tax. Another way of
achieving the same purpose is through the issue of shares in 
the mining enterprise concerned to the government, either 
without any financial payment or on concessional terms. The 
former device is often referred to as 'free equity' - but
this is a misnomer. Our analysis makes it clear that the 
issue of the equity is indeed one form of payment for 
putting the resource at the disposal of the operating 
company. As a substantial shareholder, it is common for the 
government to be offered representation on the Board of 
Directors as well. Suitably conducted, such an arrangement
can be helpful to the company in ensuring that directors
appointed by government - and presumably trusted by them - 
acquire an intimate knowledge of the problems of the 
industry: it also helps the government both to become
acquainted with the operations of the industry and,
providing the directors take the necessary trouble, to 
monitor the conduct of the company.
The table overleaf illustrates in simplified form what 
happens to the value of output, the level of profit, and the 
'rent element' if a mine turns out to be naturally much 
richer than the average of similar mines producing the same 
mineral.
The important lines to examine are 1, 7 and 10. From these, 
we can derive the following summary of results
Increase in revenue 
over base case
10% 50% 100%
Increase in profit after tax 
over base case
19% 96% 190%
Increase in 'rent element' 
over base case
100%500%1,000%
We can interpret these results in words by saying that, in 
our example:
(a) when the gross revenue increases by 10 per cent, the
profit increases by 19 per cent, and the rent element
doubles;
(b) when the gross revenue increases by 50 per cent, the
profit increases by 96 per cent, and the rent element is 
increased five-fold; and
(c) when the gross revenue doubles, the profit just about
trebles, and the rent element is increased by a factor of 10.
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No rent 
element 
case
00
I
1. Revenue (R) 90
2. Royalty @ 5% (r) 4.5
3. R - r 85.5
4. Operating costs 
including capital 
allowances 45
5. Profit before tax 40.5
6. Tax @ 40% 16-2
7. Profit after tax 24.3
8. Govt, share of
dividends (20%) 4.86
9. Operator's share of 
dividends (80%) 19.44
10. 'Rent element' in 
revenue 0
11. Total 'surplus' 45
of which —
12. Operator's take
(line 9 t line 11) 43%
13. Government take
(lines 2+6+8 -5- line 11) 57%
Base case Base case Base case
Base revenue revenue revenue
case x 1.1 x 1.5 x 2.0
100 110 150 200
5 5.5 7.5 10
95 104.5 142.5 190
45 45 45 45
50 59.5 97.5 145
20 23.8 39 58
30 35.7 58.5 87
6 7.14 11.7 17.4
24 28.56 46.8 69.6
10 20 60 110
55 65 105 155
44% 44% 45% 45%
56% 56% 55% 55%
The missing component in the royalty and tax regime 
described so far is a charge that will appropriate for the 
owner of the resource the 'lion's share' of the rent element 
arising from the exploitation of an unusually rich or 
profitable deposit. It is not sensible in practice to 
attempt to appropriate all of this rent element for the 
owner of the resource, since this would remove all incentive 
to the operator to conduct his operations efficiently. But 
it is both appropriate and necessary that the major portion 
of this element should accrue to the resource owner (ie the 
government on behalf of the people of the country) , and this 
can best be done by means of a resource rent tax (RRT) or an 
additional profits tax (APT). A prevailing opinion is that, 
if incentives to efficiency are to be maintained (which is 
strongly in the interests of the resource owner), the rate 
of the APT or RRT should not exceed 70 per cent. We now 
have in principle, the troika of charges that can best be 
put in place as the sales price for a developing country's 
natural resource.
These are:
(a) the charge upon sales, which will be particularly 
important when profits are low;
(b) the charge upon profits, which will predominate when 
profits are normal;
(c) the charge upon the rent element, which will become 
particularly important when profits are high.
A properly constructed formula for pricing the sale of the 
resource should contain all three components.
Renegotiation as a Special Case
Most analysis of agreements between mining TNCs and
developing country governments concerns itself with the
terms of initial agreements conducted before the investment 
is made and the mine constructed. Equally important in some 
cases may be be an examination of the basis upon which 
existing arrangements may be altered and an analysis of the 
conduct and terms of renegotiations.
A major alteration of the arrangements under which mining is 
conducted in a developing country may occur for any one of a 
number of reasons. The existing agreement may make 
provision for its own renegotiation. The conditions and 
assumptions under which the original agreement were
negotiated may have altered so radically that the agreement
has become impossible or intolerable for one party or the 
other. A major policy or political change may have taken 
place in the governance of the country concerned. Illegal 
or improper action may have been taken by one party or the
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other resulting in an abuse of the explicit or implicit 
arrangements hitherto in force. On not all such occasions 
will renegotiation be either appropriate or necessary. It 
may be that unilateral action is justified and called for. 
But in virtually every case where a mining company already 
operating desires, or is desired by the government in
question, to continue its mining operations, some form of 
discussion resembling a negotiation will become necessary. 
It is to the analysis of those sorts of cases, embodying 
those assumptions, that we now turn.
A government conducting a renegotiation has several clear 
advantages over a government conducting a negotiation for 
the development and exploitation of a deposit which has not 
yet been discovered and proven. To begin with, the 
existence of an exploitable orebody is known, and a great
deal of information will be available as to its richness and
potential profitability. Most of the investment for
continued operation is likely to be in place, and to some
extent may be regarded as being at hazard unless the mine 
operator agrees to terms acceptable to the government. The 
circumstances which the government will need to consider, if 
decisions are to be made primarily on economic grounds, will 
be concerned with the advantages to the country to be gained 
from:
(a) closing down the mine;
(b) taking over operations itself, or through a state-owned 
subsidiary;
(c) inviting in a new operator to replace the previous 
operator;
(d) allowing the existing operator to continue on unchanged 
terms;
(e) allowing the existing operator to continue on revised 
terms.
No clear a priori answer can be given as to which of these 
courses of action will be most advantageous for the country 
concerned. That will depend upon prevailing circumstances 
and possibilities, and to some extent also upon the policy 
objectivess which the government defines for the country. 
In economic terms, mine closure will only be sensible if the 
deposit is reaching exhaustion, if continued mining is 
uneconomic or - conceivably - if there are grounds for 
believing that the future value of the deposit will be 
greatly in excess of its current value. These possible 
conditions are not further discussed. The conduct of mining 
through a state enterprise will be dependent on the ability 
of such an enterprise to recruit, organise and manage the 
personnel required, and on its ability to maintain supplies, 
production and sales on a cost/revenue basis comparable to
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what would be attainable under other forms of organisation. 
Of importance in this respect are not only the internal 
capacities of the state enterprise itself, but the creation 
and maintenance of a gteneral politico-economic environment 
in which such enterprises can operate efficiently. The 
recruitment of a new operator to replace an existing 
operator - either on a management basis, or an ownership 
basis, or on a combination of both - is nearly always a 
theoretical possibility. It is then an empirical question 
as to whether or not the terms which would be acceptable to 
a new operator would be more advantageous to government than 
those which could be renegotiated with the existing 
operator. To allow the existing operator to continue on 
unchanged terms wold be the correct course of action only 
if, taking all circumstances into account, none of the
alternatives can be made to be more advantageous to the
government and country where the enterprise is situated. 
The last option involves a renegotiated set of arrangements 
with the existing operator. It cannot be assumed that this 
will produce the most advantageous result for the government 
concerned. It is, however, assumed for the purposes of this 
study that this is an option which the government is willing 
to examine. The modalities for conducting such an
examination will therefore be considered.
The objective must be not just to get an improved deal for 
the government, but to test out what is the best possible 
deal obtainable from a renegotiation and then to ascertain 
whether this is likely to prove more advantageous than any
alternative possible arrangement. A number of measures need 
to be taken in order to make such a test effective. These 
include the formation of an efficient negotiating team 
within government containing broad representation from 
interested ministeries, but also having access to the 
necessary professional and technical advice. The team
itself must be given a clear policy directive but must also
have access to a minister or ministerial committee so that a 
dialogue may be maintained concerning the interpretation of 
the directive into practical and negotiable arrangements. A 
sense of purposeful unity, firm but not too rigid, must be 
created between the negotiating team (including the 
component ministeries) , the political leadership, whatever 
national assembly may be required to pass legislative
measures, and popular opinion at large. It should not be 
assumed that this sense of unity automatically exists; but, 
without it, some of the actions which the government may 
need to take (or threaten) will not be possible, or
credible. In a sense, all renegotiations of this type
involve two simultaneous exercises - the first consists of 
the search for the most favourable possible agreement; the
second consists of the preparation for those actions which
will become necessary if no agreement can be reached.
Without the second exercise being mounted, the first 
exercise cannot be successful. A detailed analysis of the 
company's position also needs to be conducted to determine
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on the basis of informal, objective analysis the position 
most favourable to the government that would just be 
consistent with the company deciding that it weuld be in its 
own interest to agree to the renegotiated terms proposed. 
Once these measures are in place, the implementation of a 
strategy and of tactics for the renegotiation become 
possible.
If the renegotiation is to be successful, two impelling
forces have to be created and controlled. The impelling 
force which has to operate on the company must be the 
conviction that any alternative to acceptance of the terms 
available would be worse for the company's own interest. 
The impelling force which has to operate upon the government 
must be the conviction that no alternative solution 
realistically attainable would be more to the country's
advantage than the renegotiated terms rendered available by 
purposeful effort.
Each party to a renegotiation should be in a position to 
bring benefit to the other. If that is not the case, the 
underlying reason for a continuing association does not
exist. But each party is also likely to be in a position to 
damage the other. In procuring an advantageous result, the 
organisation of the power to damage and the organisation of 
a defence against the other party's power to damage may
prove as important as the willingness to offer benefits.
It is in respect of this last consideration that the
respective legal position of the two parties assumes 
particular importance. If a government repudiates or
unilaterally alters an agreement which appears to be both
reasonable and commercially binding, the influence of the 
offended company in preventing the successful operation of 
the enterprise under alternative managerial arrangements and 
in deterring future investment may be very considerable. 
That is bound to be a factor in the government's own
assessment of what it can realistically threaten, and of
what alternative arrangements it could advantageously 
operate. Similarly, if a company can be shown to have been 
operating in defiance of international law, that will very 
considerably strengthen the hand of a government pressing a 
demand for a substantial renegotiation - or even insisting 
upon a unilateral change - in the terms and conditions under 
which the company has previously operated.
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Chapter Three
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES: HOST COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS 
Background
Host countries have a number of expectations of foreign 
investors (TNCs). The basic expectation is that value added 
locally by the TNC will be positive, taking into account, of 
course, all foreign payments, including dividends and other 
payments to foreign enterprises such as interest, royalty, 
patent fees, head office overheads, etc. The reasons why 
host countries may be willing to concede foreign control 
over local assets, and an outflow of profits and other 
payments are:
(a) to obtain an inflow of capital on which the 'debt
service1 (namely the outflow of profit in the form of 
dividends) is payable only when the investment is 
profitable;
(b) to obtain the TNC's expertise, in production and also in 
management, marketing and in access to markets, finance, 
and inputs;
(c) these reasons interact as external lenders often insist
that a known, experienced management be in firm charge
of the project and, in practice, that usually means a 
TNC.
The host country does not necessarily have to 'buy' the
capital and expertise as one package: capital can sometimes
be borrowed or provided out of domestic savings, expertise 
can sometimes be bought separately. The two usually do come 
as one package: because it is simpler, because the TNC
often insists, because a share of the profits through 
ownership is a convenient way of giving the management an 
incentive to operate efficiently, and because the TNC's 
desire to protect the reputation of the company and its 
products can also be a useful way of encouraging efficiency. 
None of these reasons is conclusive - for example 
performance-based rewards can be built into management 
contracts - so the possibility of buying capital and 
expertise separately should be kept in mind.
Host countries also expect a number of additional benefits 
to accrue from TNC investment and production, notably:
(a) increased government revenue from direct taxation of 
profits and from the increased level of output, income 
and expenditure
(b) increased foreign exchange earnings from additional 
exports or import substitution
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(c) transfers of technology and skills, through learning by 
local employees, on the job and through training schemes
(d) re-investment of profits to expand output and further 
increase the gains already listed. As noted earlier, 
these are not gains associated with TNCs only but ones 
associated with well-chosen and operated projects 
whoever owns or manages them.
Originally, host countries thought that these benefits would 
flow more or less automatically from TNC investment. All
that was needed was to induce as much investment as 
possible. Indeed, it was even worthwhile to forgo some 
benefits in order to induce investment and so secure the 
others. Many developing countries passed legislation
offering inducements to foreign investors, such as tax 
holidays, cheap land, cheap inputs such as water and 
electricity, and other financial concessions, while at the 
same time allowing the investor complete control over the
investment and the subsequent production from it. Much of 
this legislation still exists, even though many developing 
countries' perceptions of TNCs have changed.
Most fundamentally, developing countries have become aware 
that TNC objectives may conflict with national objectives 
because of the transnational character of the investor. 
There are potential conflicts of interest between all
companies and all governments, for example over the
definition of profits for tax purposes, or over the
respective responsibilities of the company and the
government in the provision of training. But international 
investment creates additional conflicts of interest of a 
particular sort:
(a) Global profit maximisation may require different action 
by a TNC from the action of a local company maximising 
local profits. For example a TNC with spare capacity in 
existing plants abroad will usually prefer to supply
inputs from those plants, rather than develop new
production capacity in a developing country. This is 
the main reason why it is not a sufficient condition for 
investment by a TNC for there to be a profitable
investment oppotunity. A company supplying the market
already will normally only invest in local production
facilities if its market is threatened in some way, for 
example by a rival supplier offering to invest in local 
production behind tariff barriers which would exclude 
rival products. Furthermore, a company supplying inputs 
from abroad or selling output to affiliates will be able 
to choose where to receive its profits, through transfer 
pricing. Higher taxation or exchange controls in the 
host country on the remission of dividends, or even the 
possibility of them in the investor's mind, will induce 
a company to use transfer pricing (and other methods) to 
receive most or all of its profits abroad. For example
mining companies selling concentrates to associated 
companies may not charge for secondary metals contained 
- as has been asserted to be the case with Tsumeb. TNC 
banks may transfer surplus balances to their external 
head offices without receiving interest on them - as 
several banks in Namibia, most notably Barclays, do.
(b) The TNC1s bargaining position depends greatly on its 
having knowledge and skills not available to the host 
country, so the TNC has an interest in not passing on 
technology and skills to host country nationals, even 
when local salaries are lower than global ones. Because 
the interests of the local expatriate managers are to 
some extent different from those of the TNC, the local 
expatriate (or settler) staff may prevent the local 
aquisition of skills in order to protect their own jobs, 
even when head office policy is in favour of 
localisation.
(c) Whereas a local company will normally invest its 
undistributed profits either in its own expansion or in 
local financial institutions for local investment, a TNC 
may expect it to be more profitable to invest somewhere 
else in the world.
(d) The choice of technology in production is likely to be 
biased in favour of capital intensive methods in TNCs: 
because their managements are more familiar with such 
technology; because developing new technologies is 
expensive and operating diverse technologies within a 
group raises training, maintenance and spares inventory 
costs; and perhaps to reduce - for whatever reasons -the 
size of the domestic labour force. Some of these 
considerations are potentially in the host country's 
interests too (eg avoiding an untried technology does 
lower risk, and tying in to a TNC group spares and 
maintenance expert pool can lower costs) , but not all 
are consonant with its concerns.
For these and other reasons, host countries nave sought in a 
number of ways to secure control over the profits and 
management decisions of TNCs, in order to obtain what host 
countries see as a fairer share of profits, and to ensure as 
far as possible that other decisions are taken in the 
national interest. Such action falls under three main 
headings: taxation, participation in ownership, and other
controls (sometimes applicable only to foreign owned and 
controlled companies, sometimes applicable to all companies 
but intended to affect primarily the situation in foreign 
companies).
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Taxation
In some cases it has been possible to make very simple 
changes to improve the tax regime in the interest of the 
host country. For example, when the first African majority 
government took power a year before independence in Zambia, 
the copper mining companies were still paying royalty, in 
very large annual amounts, to the British South Africa 
Company in London. An offer to buy the royalty rights for 
£50mn was refused by the companies, mainly because the
British Government would not guarantee the payments (the 
then Northern Rhodesian Government could not afford to pay 
for them in one lump sum) . Research then began to reveal 
that the rights were based on a treaty signed by an African 
chief whose empire had never extended as far as the
Copperbelt and, although the legal argument was not entirely 
straightforward, the royalties were eventually acquired for 
an ex gratia payment of only £2mn. An even odder historic 
remnant is the payment of a portion of the diamond royalties 
collected from CDM in Namibia to a subsidiary of CDM which 
holds the royalty rights originally granted during the
period of German chartered company rule.
In general, the host country is faced with the problem of 
taxing TNCs as much as possible without discouraging new
investment and reinvestment of profits by existing 
companies. If new foreign investment is wanted, it is not 
enough simply to tax in a way that appears optimal in local 
circumstances: tax rates need also to appear reasonable by
international standards. A similar argument applies to 
compulsory acquisition of TNC assets.
It is essential for any host country negotiating with a TNC 
that it should be in a position to understand that
particular TNC's motives. For instance, it may be wrong to 
assume that a TNC will be acting exclusively as a maximiser 
of profit after tax, and therefore will be induced to invest 
by tax concessions at least as generous as those offered by 
other countries. Some TNC investment is induced by the 
threat of losing the market to a rival company. Some 
investment is undertaken in order to capture a larger share 
of the market: for example, Fiat invested in an assembly
plant in Zambia because a near 100 per cent share of the 
market for complete kits for assembly was much more 
profitable than a very small share of the market for
assembled cars. In this case the main profit was in Italy, 
the main incentive for the investment being the promise of 
tariff and other barriers against imports of other makes of 
car. Any tax concession in such a case is a waste of 
government resources, since the investment would almost 
certainly take place without it. Further, assembly
operations protected by high tariffs often have net foreign 
exchange costs (including components, fuel, expatriate
salaries and servicing of foreign loans) greater than the 
cost of directly importing the finished product.
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Similarly, a large German brewery was chosen by the Botswana 
Development Corporation (BDC) to be its partner in building 
a brewery in Botswana. The new company was given an 
exclusive licence and a 50 per cent tariff against imports - 
in other words the Botswana Government did its best to 
present the Botswana market to the new company'. The
important question was why a company from several thousand 
miles away should have been interested in an investment in 
such a small and remote market. The whole Botswana market 
would have added only about 0.35 per cent to the total sales 
of the TNC, which hardly seemed to justify the trouble and 
expense. The company could have been simply a machinery 
seller, able to make a quick profit on the sale of the
brewing machinery, and using Botswana Government money to 
cover most of the cost. However, the TNC put up half of the 
money, so that it would have had to make more than 50 per 
cent on machinery sales, in commission and brokerage (or 
kickbacks), in order to recover its capital and make a 
profit without having also to make a profit on production. 
This seemed very unlikely, especially as the machinery came 
from nine different suppliers, none of whom had any overt 
connection with the TNC. As it turned out, when further 
capital was needed after production had begun, the TNC
provided it, thus confirming that it was interested in 
achieving profitable production. In the end it appeared
certain that the real reason for the investment was a desire 
to establish the brand name in Southern Africa behind 
protective tariff barriers and exclusive production rights 
in Botswana, with the idea of selling eventually in the very 
much larger South African market. An attempt to set up in 
South Africa in the first instance would almost certainly 
have been defeated by the already established South African 
brewers. If this analysis is correct, then the concessions 
offered by Botswana were correct: a quasi-guarantee of the
Botswana beer market for eight years, but without any tax 
concessions, and with 60 per cent government participation 
in what was expected to be a high return on capital invested 
project. As it happened, the TNC underestimated the 
difficulty of setting up a brewery in a country with almost 
no previous experience of large-scale manufacturing, and 
provided not nearly enough skilled personnel, against the 
advice of the BDC. But the point of this example is that, 
perhaps a little fortuitously, the incentive was appropriate 
to the objectives of the investor.
What has to be avoided is the offer of tax concessions to 
firms whose investment intentions are unaffected thereby. 
Thus firms whose investment is dependent on the grant of 
tariff protection, or the grant of an exclusive 
manufacturing licence, or the sale of machinery, or the sale 
of patent rights, or the discovery of a mineral deposit, or 
the guarantee of a supply of a raw material for processing 
abroad, should not normally be granted tax concessions. In 
some cases, however, a combination of a lower import duty 
and a tax concession or a mining licence with a moderate
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royalty plus a concession on company tax at low (but not
higher) profit levels may be desirable. In practice, the
'classic' investor of economic theory, whose sole investment 
motive is the maximisation of profit after tax, and who is 
prepared to invest without seeking from the government 
concessions which are particular to his investment, is 
extremely rare in Africa, which suggests that broad quasi­
automatic tax concessions are likely to be expensive but not 
to attract much investment which would not otherwise have 
come. There is also no point in a tax policy based on the 
need to induce new foreign investment • if, for quite 
different reasons, little or no foreign investment is taking 
place. ' For example, if the political stance of the 
government is such that TNCs are mostly unwilling to invest, 
say because of some dispute between the government and
existing investors, then tax concessions will induce no 
investment, but may have the effect of reducing tax payments 
on existing investments or on the few new investments which 
sometimes take place even in very unlikely circumstances.
In certain cases it may pay to trade off potential tax
revenue for other benefits. For example, in the case of 
Botswana's main coal deposit, if lower royalties and taxes 
will induce Shell to take responsibility for building and 
operating the Trans Kalahari (Botnam) railway this may be a 
good bargain.
Participation
In the case of the Botswana brewery, the main reason for BDC 
participation was to increase the public sector's share of 
the profits. It was also intended, though, that the BDC 
would be able, through participation in management at board 
of directors level, to influence the TNC's policies on a 
number of other issues of interest to the government. These 
would normally include, in developing countries generally, 
such matters as training, localisation of staff, choice of 
technology, recognition of unions (although governments' 
attitudes on this point vary among countries), environmental 
choices (including, in the case of the Botswana brewery, the 
choice between bottles and cans), and any number of other 
issues. It is indeed possible for government participation 
to achieve some of these objectives, especially if a good 
working relationship is established. The government is more 
likely to be successful if its representatives have business 
experience and are not all civil servants, and if the 
government's board members are backed by a technical team of 
advisors with relevant legal, accounting, business and other 
relevant skills. In practice there is a danger that the 
government board members will arrive at board meetings 
having not had time to read the board papers thoroughly, 
without proper briefing, and therefore very unlikely to be 
able to challenge the company board members.
Even on wholly owned parastatal boards, where no TNC is 
involved, the management have an enormous advantage over 
part time board members, because of their control of 
information and greater knowledge of the company's business. 
Even in such relatively ideal circumstances, where there is 
a much greater communality of interest than in the case of 
TNC-government joint shareholdings, government
representation on boards of directors is not sufficient to 
achieve all of the government's objectives. In the case of 
TNCs, it is a useful way of allowing a small number of 
nationals to learn something about the company's operations. 
Even this modest aim will only be achieved if a proper flow 
of information reaches the board. When relations between 
government and TNC are bad, the management can very easily 
control this flow, thus preventing some or all of the 
potential gains of board membership from accruing to the 
host country.
In principle at least there is nothing to prevent a state 
from legislating to require major company boards to accept a 
government appointed member, irrespective of ownership. If 
such a director is well briefed and alert he can probably do 
as much to collect information and influence decisions as 
one named by virtue of a minority shareholding.
The really crucial point is that ownership and the related 
privilege of board membership are not sufficient to achieve 
government objectives. The taxation authorities will have 
to be just as careful in their scrutiny of the jointly owned 
TNCs accounts as when the company was wholly foreign owned. 
And all other policies intended to reconcile TNC and 
government objectives will also have to remain in place and 
be pursued as vigourously as ever. The big danger to be 
avoided is a situation in which government regards part 
ownership and board membership as adequate in themselves to 
control TNCs in the government interest. Two approaches 
which can be used relate to audit. One is to give the 
government, as shareholder, the power to name the
enterprise's internal auditor and to require him to report 
direct to the Board. A second is to give the government, as 
shareholder or more generally, the power to name the 
external auditors - ideally a national firm, if a qualified 
one like the State Audit Corporation in Tanzania, exists - 
and to require that their reports go directly to the Board 
and to the government.
In some cases, the inadequacy of ownership as a means of
control is made explicit in a management agreement. For 
example, when the Zambian Government took a 51 per cent 
share of the copper mines in Zambia, the new management
agreement set out that the representatives of the minority 
(49 per cent) shareholders, voting separately, would have to 
approve 'all expansion plans and appropriations out of
profit for capital expenditure or expenditure on exploration 
and prospecting'. As one of the main stated objectives of
the takeover was to increase the rate of reinvestment of 
profit in expansion, this provision effectively took away 
any power that the government might have been expected to 
gain from its new ownership of the mines. Furthermore, the 
agreement gave the minority directors a specific directive 
'not to approve any undertaking for which the companies 
could not raise money on commercially competitive terms', 
which meant in practice that new investment would have to
have the approval of foreign capital, since Zambian
financial markets could not have provided large enough sums 
for any significant expansion. The agreement also -stated 
that any post-tax profits not needed for capital or
prospecting expenditure would have to be paid out as a 
dividend. The agreement did also state, however, that the 
minority directors should not unreasonably veto any
commercially viable projects; the value of this provision 
would obviously depend on the capacity of the government- 
appointed directors to identify such projects independently 
of the companies' managements. Such a combination of TNC 
shareholder vetos on certain decisions with a clause 
requiring that consent not be unreasonably withheld may be 
inevitable under some circumstances. TNC shareholders 
cannot be expected both to risk substantial capital sums and 
to have no power over decisions which could reduce profits 
substantially or cause losses. Since the impact of such 
decisions might be to serve other state interests, the 
government's interest in the value of its shareholding may 
not be seen as an adequate safeguard. As it happened, after 
the takeover a number of plans for expansion of mining 
capacity were announced, some at least of which could 
probably be attributed to the takeover, including the tax 
changes which were part of the whole takeover deal. 
Although the tax changes were probably important in 
encouraging expansion plans, the takeover itself, the terms 
of which were in the end freely agreed between the parties, 
also played a part in that it removed uncertainty about the 
future ownership of the companies and the terms of 
compensation.
The point of the Zambian example is that ownership in itself 
does not necessarily give very much advantage to the
government, in the short term at least. There is some gain, 
for both parties, in the removal of uncertainty and the
establishment of a structure which obviously has a better 
chance than 100 per cent foreign ownership of lasting for a 
long period; but the fact of majority ownership in itself 
does not increase the amount of resources available to a 
government for the excercise of detailed control over TNC
operations. In the Zambian case, the government felt that 
it had to continue with the existing management groups in 
the absence of any reasonable alternative, and in those 
circumstances could only seek the political advantages of 
majority participation in the copper companies. The real 
issues, of getting as much as possible out of the mining 
companies for Zambia, had still to be pursued by all the
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various government departments responsible - localisation by 
the Labour Department, proper definition of profits by the 
taxation authorities, prompt sale of foreign exchange to the 
Bank of Zambia, and so on. At the same time, the government 
appointed directors must avoid giving implicit government 
approval to TNC policies: the company appointed directors
will try and push policies through the board of directors
which have public policy implications. Unless the
government directors are alert to this strategy, the company 
will later be able to claim government approval because of
the presence of the government directors at the board
meetings.
Once the state is a partner in a joint venture with a TNC,
alliances may change. In Zambia, for example, before the 
partial nationalisation, the government and workers were 
usually allied against the companies on wage issues. After, 
the workers and TNC shareholders tended to push for higher 
wages than the government favoured. The reason is that 
labour costs are a fairly low share of total costs but that 
copper mine wages tend to pull other wages (including those 
of the public service) after them. Thus increases, which by 
improving morale or deterring strikes would raise copper 
company profits, might also sharply increase state wages 
bills and inflationary pressures.
To ensure that mining companies sell at the 'going price' 
requires either detailed monitoring or a state controlled 
mineral export corporation buying from the mines and selling 
internationally. The Zambian experience with Memaco (Metal 
Marketing Corporation) suggests that, if adequate marketing 
expertise is hired, such a company can cause modest 
increases in mineral export earnings and mining company 
profits as well as earning a profit itself.
In deciding how much compensation to pay for a share in a 
TNC operation, the host country must decide just exactly 
what it is that it wishes to buy. If the country needs the 
continued cooperation of the existing management, then the 
price must be adequate to satisfy that particular group. On 
the other hand if management-marketing-technical contracts 
offer a continued (even if lower) profit flow, a TNC may 
accept a lower price for all or part of the equity than it 
otherwise would. If the country wishes to continue to 
receive new TNC investment, then the price paid must somehow 
be presented to the world, the world of TNC decision makers 
in particular, as being 'reasonable'. In the bargaining, 
both parties will try to make out to the world at large that 
its own position is more in line with current definitions of 
a reasonable price. For example, President Kaunda announced 
from the start that the copper mines in Zambia would be paid 
for on the basis of the book value of their assets. This is 
by no means an unambiguous definition, and was of course 
only the opening shot in a strenuous bargaining process. 
But it was a serious attempt to create an impression of
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fairness in the public mind, and to make it more difficult, 
therefore, for the TNCs to make a claim for a different 
basis of compensation.
President Allende, from a more radical political standpoint, 
announced a similar method of compensation for the Chilean 
copper mines, but also said that the amount of exploitation 
in the past would be deducted from any compensation 
otherwise due. This proposition was taken seriously: a
formula for calculating past exploitation was announced and 
the amounts carefully researched. One mine which had only 
recently been opened, and which had thus had no chance to 
exploit Chile by making exdess profits, was paid for in cash 
to show the good faith of the Chilean government. But the 
calculations showed that the other companies owed money to 
the Chilean government, net. This was not acceptable to the 
companies, nor considered reasonable by the international 
business world in general. The result was that the
companies did not agree to any of the proposed terms for 
compensation. American banks had already begun to cut off 
Chilean lines of credit. The point is not whether this 
response was fair, nor even whether some reduction in 
compensation on the basis of past high profits or other TNC 
actions can ever be justified internationally. It is that, 
because the Chilean aproach was not seen as reasonable, it 
incurred costs to Chile.
Comparing these two examples, the Zambian government was
successful, in the sense that an agreement was reached, and 
investment continued. The Chilean government failed to 
convince the world that itsformula was a fair one, and this 
led not only to a failure to agree on the terms of a 
takeover, but is also generally believed to have contributed 
in part to the fall of the Allende government. It is not 
possible, though, to say whether the Zambian government paid 
too much for its 51 per cent share of the copper mines,
merely that it paid enough. Nor is it possible to say how 
much more the Chilean Government would have had to pay to 
reach an agreement and satisfy the world at large, merely
that it did not offer enough to achieve that purpose.
Definitions of what is and is not acceptable as reasonable 
vary over time, as well as among different groups, so that 
it is essential to keep up to date with agreements between 
developing country governments and TNCs, in order to be able 
to avoid paying more than is necessary to achieve the 
country's objectives. On the whole, public opinion has 
shifted in favour of developing countries in the last 40 
years. The sort of agreements made before the Second World 
War, and during the post-war colonial period, would now be 
considered even by the most capitalist observers (TNC owners 
and managers for example) as exploitative. TNC
representatives have also come to realise that unfair 
agreements are increasingly unlikely to be allowed to last, 
so that there is advantage to both sides in reaching
agreements that are seen to be fair by modern standards. 
This does not mean that developing country governments can 
rely on TNCs to propose reasonable agreements unilaterally; 
a few years of excessive profits can be more than enough 
reward to compensate for the cost of a renegotiation, so the 
host country still has to press its case. But the arguments 
for a share in ownership and control, and for arrangements 
to prevent very large windfall profits, are now considered 
normal by TNC representatives and other potential investors. 
For example, additional profits taxes tied to rates of 
return on net worth (or assets employed) are becoming fairly 
common in the mining sector.
It is worth noting that there are some potential 
disadvantages to government participation in TNC operations. 
If the TNC makes heavy losses, and needs new finance to 
maintain its operations, then the government may find that 
it has to find some of the money. For example, the Zambian 
copper mines have borrowed at times from the Bank of Zambia 
in order to avoid closures and the resulting loss of foreign 
exchange earnings and employment. Some of these loans have 
subsequently been converted into additional shares for the 
Government, which now has more than a 51 per cent 
shareholding as a result, but the cost to the government of 
this support was very high at a time of financial crisis.
The copper-nickel mine at Selebi-Phikwe in Botswana has also 
made losses from the start of operations, requiring large 
additional inputs of finance. For a number of years, this 
additional finance came entirely from the foreign 
shareholders; furthermore, the foreign shareholders were 
obliged to keep the operation going despite it having very 
little hope of paying off its huge debts and giving some 
return on the shareholders' money. To some extent this
situation was the result of good negotiation by the Botswana 
Government. The agreement specified that the money borrowed 
by the Botswana Government to pay for the infrastructure 
associated with the mine, including water, electricity and 
the railway spur, would be guaranteed by the foreign
shareholders (mainly the two big mining groups Anglo 
American and Amax) . This meant that if the mine had closed 
the shareholders would have had to pay off not only their 
own debts but also the Botswana Government's debts. The
government was also lucky in that one of the shareholders,
Anglo American, was deeply involved in the very successful 
diamond mining projects in Botswana, and so had an interest 
in good relations with the government. A second piece of 
luck was that the foreign shareholders had complete 
financial responsibility for the copper-nickel project until 
the completion of 'Phase 1'. The latter was defined to 
include the start of the sale of sulphuric acid, a by­
product of the refinery, under contract to a foreign 
company. Because of a technical failure at the refinery,
one of the main causes together with low metal prices of the
project's losses, this part of Phase 1 became impossible to
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complete, leaving the full financial responsibility with the 
foreign shareholders for a number of years.
These two examples show that the advantages of government 
participation have to be compared with the risks involved. 
It may be, of course, that in a bad period for a mining or 
other enterprise, the government may have to provide finance 
to keep a business going in the public interest, even if it 
is wholly privately owned. This has indeed happened in 
Zimbabwe recently. But it is much easier for a company to 
bring pressure on a government to support it, if that
government is a substantial shareholder.
TNCs in the Financial Sector
The financial sector in Namibia, as in many African
countries both before and after the end of the colonial
period, is dominated by a small number of foreign commercial 
banks. A number of complaints are normally made about the 
behaviour of these banks and the adverse way that it affects 
development and other national objectives. The importance 
of these criticisms is that the significance of banks is far 
greater than indicated by the amount of capital invested or 
the number of people employed in them. Banks have a major 
influence, by their lending decisions, on the speed and
direction of national development. It seems certain that an 
independent government in Namibia will have to consider the 
same or very similar criticisms, and what financial reforms 
will be in the country's best interest. The experience of
other African countries is relevant to these future
decisions, especially as not all financial reforms directed 
at foreign owned banks have had the intended effects.
Among the many criticisms made of foreign commercial banks
in Africa are:
that they lend mostly to other TNCs, and to the
non-African community;
that they place their liquid assets abroad; 
that, in the colonial period, they were underlent; 
that they lend mainly short term, indeed mainly to 
finance foreign trade;
that not enough credit goes to agriculture;
that not enough credit goes to small-scale
borrowers, rural and urban;
that they are slow to localise their staff.
Before discussing what can and has been done to remedy these 
shortcomings, it is worth noting that some foreign bank 
practice is justified, and is in the interest of the host 
country. Thus it is of real benefit to have a banking 
system that is regarded by depositors as a safe place to put 
their money; bank failures are very damaging to development, 
since financial intermediation enables a country to make
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better use of savings and liquid assets than it can when 
people hold gold for example; and the holding of notes means 
that saving is being made available only to the government, 
at the expense of those who borrow from banks. There have 
been very few bank failures in Africa (although there were a 
number in Nigeria in the early 1950s among small locally 
owned banks) and this is attributable to the size and, to 
some extent the caution, of the foreign banks. 
Nevertheless, there remain the disadvantages listed above;
these are discussed below.
Bank lending to TNCs can be controlled by means of exchange 
control regulations limiting the amount that may be borrowed 
by foreign controlled companies, and by non-residents. In 
Botswana, for example, foreign companies may only borrow,
above P100,000, up to the amount of capital they have 
brought into the country without special permission. In 
such a small economy, that gives the central bank a 
considerable amount of control over all lending, because of 
the dominance of a few large corporations. The rule is
reinforced by the regulation in the Financial Institutions 
Act requiring banks to seek permission to lend more than 10 
per cent of their capital and reserves to any one customer, 
which covers both foreign and domestic borrowers, and so
prevents the authorities losing control of TNCs which are 
partly sold to local interests. Local lending to TNCs can 
be limited by this means; in most cases the TNC can obtain 
alternative credit from abroad, so that this exchange 
control rule becomes a means of encouraging a foreign 
capital inflow. Less lending by local banks to TNCs does 
not necessarily mean that more will be lent to locally owned 
businesses and to local individuals. Commercial banks may 
simply accumulate additional liquid assets in the absence of 
what they see as a lack of creditworthy borrowers.
In Namibia a special factor is that many large companies - 
for example CDM - do not maintain their main bank accounts 
in Namibia nor bring export proceeds back except to meet 
local expenses. Requiring all domestic enterprises to bank 
locally and bring in all export proceeds (possibly with 
specific exceptions at the discretion of the Bank of
Namibia) would increase the volume of local deposits, the
quantity of business attractive to TNC banks and Namibian 
foreign exchange reserves.
It was certainly true that commercial banks were at times
underlent in colonial times, and that their excess funds 
were placed abroad, although there were also examples of TNC 
banks lending more than their local deposits. In the
absence of local opportunities to invest liquid balances, 
the money must by definition be placed abroad. The issue of 
local Treasury Bills, or the opening of call accounts for 
commercial banks at a central bank, is sufficient to enable 
banks to invest their liquid assets locally; and they can 
easily be required to do so by the government. In Botswana,
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in the late 1970s, the interest that could be earned on Bank 
of Botswana call accounts was much lower than what the banks 
had received in the Johannesburg money market previously, 
and even further below what could be earned on loans. As a 
matter of policy, this latter gap was widened to encourage 
the banks to increase their lending locally; but the effect 
was negligible. The slack demand for loans from customers 
that the banks thought creditworthy, at a time of slow or 
zero growth in the economy, meant that the banks simply did 
not use their low yielding excess liquidity. This attracted 
some criticism. But once the country no longer had access 
to the foreign exchange reserves of South Africa, which 
occurred when the Bank of Botswana began operations, the 
excess liquidity of the banks reflected in part the foreign 
reserves of the country, and was needed therefore in case of 
a sudden change in the balance of payments. For this 
reason, it is not necessarily the case that underlending by 
the banks is against the national interest in an independent 
monetary system. In Botswana's case, a fall in diamond 
revenue in 1981/82 caused the banks to use up their excess 
liquidity very quickly.
The time profile, as opposed to volume, of lending by TNC 
banks in Africa is even more difficult to alter. The banks 
maintain that their unwillingness to make long term loans is 
because of the short term nature of their liabilities. They 
claim that it would be unsound banking practice to make long 
term loans out of short term deposits. This reflects an 
unnecessary degree of caution for two reasons. The banks' 
short term deposits are the country's money supply, and a 
large proportion of it is therefore extremely stable. An 
individual bank might conceivably lose a large amount of its 
deposits to the other banks. This is rather unlikely; 
furthermore the money could either be borrowed back 
directly, or it could be borrowed from the central bank, one 
of whose functions is to support a sound bank against just 
this possibility. African economies in particular, and 
underveloped economies in general, are very vulnerable to 
outflows of cash, for example because of a fall in export 
receipts. But that is precisely why banks are required to 
maintain a proportion of their liabilities as liquid assets; 
the risk of decreases in deposits in the economy as a whole
is the responsibility of the monetary authorities as part of
overall macroeconomic policy. Certainly it would be 
dangerous if all the lending of commercial banks were to be 
long term and thus impossible to reduce quickly, but it is 
quite sound for them to use a larger proportion than at 
present (in most countries) of their liabilities for long 
term lending, however vulnerable the economy in question. 
Unfortunately, the prejudices of the managers of foreign 
commercial banks, especially British ones, are reinforced by 
the rules and operating instructions laid down by head 
offices, which makes it doubly difficult to induce bank
managements to change their practices. This prejudice 
against mixing long term (investment) and short term
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(working capital) banking is shared by the World Bank and a 
number of bilateral development agencies. Therefore, after 
building up a medium term loan-wing within the (state owned, 
basically citizen managed) National Bank of Commerce, 
Tanzania felt it necessary to spin it off as a separate 
Tanzania Investment Bank to secure low interest, long term 
international and national agency credits which were 
unavailable so long as it remained a wing of the NBC.
The problem of insufficient lending to small scale 
businesses, and especially small scale farmers, is rather 
different. There are genuine reasons why this type of 
lending may be too risky, or too expensive in administrative 
terms, for formal sector financial institutions. Most small 
scale businessmen, including small scale farmers, are indeed 
high risk borrowers. Furthermore, the cost of lending to 
them is high, even if they do pay back (there is some 
evidence that small-scale farmers have better repayment 
records than large scale farmers). The cost of appraising a 
small loan application is not proportionately smaller than 
the cost of appraising a large one. Small businessmen do 
not have such good financial records (if any) to show the 
bank manager. Small-scale farmers in particular tend to be 
further from banks, making it expensive to visit them. 
Small loans tend therefore to be unprofitable for a formal 
sector lender who has to pay salaries, keep proper records 
which can be audited, etc. On a $500 loan, for example, 
with a five percentage point margin between the bank's 
borrowing and lending rates, the gross margin for the lender 
is only $25; that is not enough to pay for one visit by the 
bank manager, if he has to drive a few miles in a Land Rover 
over bad roads, and leaves nothing for other administrative
expenses and provision for bad debts.
These problems are undoubtedly compounded by the inability 
of expatriate bank managers to speak local languages and 
understand local society. There must be a number of local 
businessmen who could borrow successfully from TNC banks,
but who remain unidentified by expatriate bank managers 
because they cannot distinguish between good and bad local 
loan applications. Bank managers in some small towns may 
have spare capacity, in the sense that their ability to 
appraise loans is not being fully used. They might,
therefore, be able to do more lending at very low 
opportunity cost. But there is a limit, which would be 
quickly reached even in ideal circumstances, to the amount
of additional lending that could be undertaken without 
subsidy for this reason. A large-scale increase in lending 
to small scale business, including farmers, does require 
subsidy. That is why all independent African governments 
have set up specialised lending institutions to cater for 
small businesses and small farmers in particular. Many
governments have also brought various types of pressure on 
existing banks to make them lend more to this sector.
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The experience of agricultural lending banks has often been 
bad. In Zambia, for example, two consecutive banks have 
failed and been replaced: the Credit Organisation of
Zambia, which lent K25mn and had a repayment record of less 
than 10 per cent in some areas when it was wound up; while 
its successor the Agricultural Finance Corporation also 
failed a few years later. Both banks were given the near 
impossible task of operating along commercial lines, while 
also being expected to lend to large numbers of small scale 
farmers at relatively low rates of interest. Even with 
subsidised liabilities, in the form of soft loans and equity 
on which dividends are not required to be paid, it is hard 
for such banks to operate commercially.
One reason is that small-scale farmers are constrained in 
several ways: they lack not only additional finance, but
also knowledge, markets, inputs, etc. A rural credit 
institution acting on its own cannot remove all these 
constraints; and the coordination of all the
necessary services is possible but very difficult. Credit 
on its own nearly always tends to reinforce existing 
inequalities, in rural as well as urban situations, since 
the better off borrowers are better able to obtain and make 
productive use of credit, and cost less to administer. An 
interesting example of a government owned lending 
institution with a very good repayment record is Botswana's 
National Development Bank (NDB). During the period up to 
1979, the NDB had negligible bad debts, but this was 
apparently achieved by being so cautious that it had 
negative real growth in its lending from 1975 to 1979 . 
Since 1979, lending has increased rapidly (from P4mn to 
P22mn in two and a half years) ; it is too soon to know the 
result of this change of policy, but the evidence from
elsewhere suggests that problems of unpaid interest and loss 
of loan principal are likely to occur.
There is probably a case for some sort of subsidised 
government credit institution. And an independent
government in Namibia is almost certain to create one, or to 
extend the role of an existing institution. The lessons
that can be learnt from experience elsewhere in Africa are: 
that too much can not be expected of credit alone, that high 
interest rates or subsidised administrative costs are 
necessary if small scale farmers and businessmen are to be 
reached successfully, that the bank will seek out the more 
successful if it is charged with operating in any way 
'commercially1, that financial subsidy in the form of cheap 
loans tends to encourage the inefficient use of capital and 
tends to avoid the public scrutiny rightly undergone by 
other more direct forms of subsidy. The areas in which such 
a specialised, only quasi-commercial approach to medium and 
long term lending is usually needed are small scale
agriculture, low and medium cost housing and - less clearly
- small scale commercial and service enterprises. In the 
case of Namibia even large scale farming probably falls in
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this category, since the sector as a whole is making 
substantial losses (before subsidies) despite sub­
subsistence wages and capital grants. While there are a 
Landbank, a Building Society and a Development Corporation 
none is actually oriented to meeting African need and none 
appears to be very successful, even in commercial terms.
As already noted, the question of the long-term lending (and 
equity stake holding) financial institutions is broader than 
that of small, high cost, high risk credit users. A case 
for at least one such institution - possibly with initial 
foreign bank participation in ownership and management - 
exists. Divisions within it could specialise in
manufacturing, construction and mining; agriculture and 
fisheries; commerce and services; and buildings. The likely 
initial volume of business and scarcity of personnel suggest 
deferring setting up additional specialised sectoral 
investment banks.
The question also arises as to whether the TNC banks should 
be pressed into new forms of lending, and how this should be 
done. Alternatively, governments have tried tried to 
achieve their objectives by creating new government owned 
commercial banks, or by taking over the existing TNC banks.
In Malawi, the government forced the two big TNC banks to 
merge, with a majority of the shares taken over by the 
government. The new bank, together with the other banks, 
was instructed to increase the proportion of its lending 
going to agriculture to 50 per cent. Whatever the 
intention, the result has been a very rapid increase in 
lending to the estate sector, rather than to smallholders, 
with large numbers of the urban salaried class setting up 
tobacco estates with borrowed money. It has also - in
conjunction with falling export prices - led to a wave of 
receiverships and of doubtful or bad loans on the banks'
books.
In Zambia, the government created a new commercial bank, 
intending to use it to transform the nature of bank lending 
in favour of locally owned businesses and farmers. Very 
quickly the government realised that this would take too 
long to achieve ('we are a very young nation and we cannot 
wait' President Kaunda in his Matero speech, 1970), and 
announced that it would take a 51 per cent share in the TNC 
banks. In the end, negotiations failed to reach agreement; 
the lack of enough local skilled personnel to take over from 
expatriates meant that the banks were able to hold out for 
better terms than the government was prepared to offer.
In Tanzania, in similar circumstances, when the TNC banks 
threatened to withdraw all their expatriate staff, the 
government was in a position to call their bluff. Including 
locally resident non-citizen Asian middle managers and 
expatriate personnel of three smaller banks, there were
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enough skilled personnel to operate the system even when the 
two main British banks withdrew their European personnel.
In Ghana, the government also created a new commercial bank 
to challenge the TNC banks; the new bank found itself under 
great pressure to lend to Ghanaian businesses and to lend on 
easier terms, with the result that it was stuck with a 
disproportionate amount of the marginal lending, and 
political pressure to treat its borrowers leniently.
In Botswana, there has been no suggestion of participation 
in the existing TNC banks; instead the government has 
considered from time to time admitting a third foreign bank 
to the country, to increase competition and to have a 
different style of banking available from that of the two 
existing banks. A third bank was finally set up in 1982. 
One of the conditions imposed on the new bank was that it 
would set up a branch in an area without banking facilities. 
It is too soon to say whether the other objectives have been 
achieved.
Clearly, some countries have found that they can control 
their foreign commercial banks to their satisfaction without 
owning them. The powers of central banks are indeed very 
great. But if a government wishes to direct credit in a 
detailed way, as has been done in Tanzania, it is probably 
necessary to have complete control of the bank and its 
management. The question for a new Namibian government to 
decide is whether it wishes to retain the skills of the TNC 
banks in allocating credit, on what they consider to be 
commercial criteria. These criteria can be modified by 
broad government guidelines, enforced by means other than 
direct ownership of a majority of the shares, but at the 
risk that the results may not necessarily be those intended. 
Alternatively, the government might wish to allocate credit 
according to planning criteria, in which case ownership and 
day-to-day control is probably necessary. A different 
reason for government participation would be simply to share 
in the profits, which can be exceptionally high in a small 
country with a large mining sector (or in a post­
independence boom) . Local management will only be possible, 
though, if there is a large enough cadre of local skilled 
personnel, unless the government is willing to allow the 
banks to be run by the original managers - or perhaps some 
other TNC bank - under a management contract.
Concerning the creation of a new commercial bank, whether 
privately or government owned, not much can be expected of 
it in the short term. There would be a danger of it being 
stuck with marginal and unprofitable lending; indeed, in 
order to establish public confidence, it might even have to 
be more cautious at first in its lending policies. In 
addition, it would take years for a new bank to build up a 
branch network, so that in the short and medium term there 
would be a tendency for it to concentrate its lending in the
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major cities. Meanwhile, the creation of new financial 
institutions does nothing to relieve the shortage of skilled 
local personnel; on the contrary, it tends to make it worse, 
as would the necessary creation of a central bank. Allowing 
an additional TNC bank to set up, assuming the market is 
large enough to attract one, could improve competition and 
introduce new lending practices, but there is not at present 
much evidence as to whether this actually happens.
In Namibia the likely departure of the Afrikaans banks at 
independence and the weakness of the local private bank 
might be seen as creating an opening for a nationally owned 
commercial bank. However, they will leave no trained 
citizen staff, few accounts and few loans. Indeed little 
more than premises, cleaning staff and - one may fear -bad 
debts. That is no foundation for a commercial bank; if one 
is to be created it must start from square one. As these 
banks are -with the exception of one town - not critical to 
Namibia's banking network, it might be more prudent to ask 
one of the major banks (Barclays and Standard) to open a 
Katima Mulilo branch and to let other businesses make their 
own choice among the two or three remaining commercial 
bank s.
A special issue in Namibia is that one of the main banks 
operates as a series of branches of its South African 
parent, two relate to the South African (not the parent 
British) head offices of their groups and another group has 
branches in South Africa as well as Namibia. This could be 
resolved by requiring local (Namibian) incorporation, 
divestiture of branches in South Africa and routing of 
shareholding, management and personnel relations to the 
group's European head offices. Comparable restructuring 
proved fully acceptable to Barclays and Standard in Botswana 
after its independence.
On personnel, it seems the TNC banks can be fairly easily 
persuaded to set up training schemes. On the face of it, 
there is a big financial incentive for them to localise 
because of the high cost of expatriates. However, the local 
expatriate managers may see their interest differently from 
the interests of the management at head office abroad, so 
the progress of localisation has to be monitored.
The second is the importance of priorities and sequences (or 
selectivity and timing) . To try to do everything that will 
be desirable over 10 years, at once, is likely to lead to 
failure by spreading resources too thin. This is as true of 
negotiations with and participation in, or takeover of, TNCs 
as in any other economic or social sector. The most 
important issues - and the operating areas of importance in 
which there is no realistic alternative to state action - 
need to be tackled first, and a base built up for acting 
more widely, as capacity and experience accumulate.
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A more general question relates to priorities, sequences and 
timing. The Bank of Namibia must be Namibian owned with 
Namibian, and Namibian hired expatriate, management from the 
start. Its success is crucial to macroeconomic and
financial sector policy and control. Similarly the state 
cannot avoid reorganising the Land Bank, Building Society
and first National Development Corporation; and it cannot, 
realistically, expect that they will be of interest to TNCs, 
whether it wants their participation or not. Thus a case 
can be made out for initially permitting the main TNC owned 
commercial banks to operate without state ownership, but 
within a framework of financial laws and regulations
monitored by the Bank of Namibia, and subject to strict
requirements as to the training and promotion of citizen 
personnel.
General Conclusion
Mining and banking are not the only sectors - in Namibia or 
elsewhere - involving TNCs. However, they are important 
sectors which illustrate most of the general fiscal, 
financial, and participation issues, as well as several 
special to their own sectoral contexts.
Two general points require reiteration. The first is that, 
because personpower development is important, secondary and 
tertiary graduates -and places in training institutions - 
must be allocated to enterprises (including TNCs and joint 
ventures) as well as to the government and 100 per cent 
state owned enterprises. A number of African states have 
been slow to adopt such a policy with the result that 
enterprise (including sometimes even public and joint 
venture enterprise) managerial and professional cadres have 
remained almost totally expatriate. This is conducive 
neither to government understanding of enterprises, nor to 
implementing control over enterprise activities. Nor does 
it help in building up national capacity to run the economy, 
including its directly productive, investible surplus, tax 
revenue and foreign exchange generating sectors.
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Chapter Four
THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
Negotiation is a process intended to achieve results 
corresponding to goals. Therefore, to be successful, 
participation in negotiation requires identification of (and 
prioretisation among) goals; collection and analysis of data 
(including, for a state, the probable goals and targets of 
the TNC) ; identification of initial, fallback and minimum 
targets derived from the goals and analysis and devising 
strategy and tactics for achieving an outcome at or above 
the minimum targets.
Clearly negotiations require personnel, knowledge collection 
and analysis capacity and their results depend on what 
relative bargaining power the state and the TNC have (in 
itself an objective for data collection and analysis). 
However, to discuss these in detail would take one well 
outside the scope of this study. What is discussed here is 
a systematic approach to state-TNC negotiations; a factor 
often notable by its absence in actual negotiations 
(sometimes on the TNCs, but more frequently on the state's, 
side of the table).
Goal Definition and Articulation
Broad political economic and sociopolitical goals are 
inherently political and form a context for, not a component 
of, negotiations with TNCs. However, their articulation and 
the formulation of specific acceptable targets is integral 
both to any overall approach to a cluster of negotiations 
(quite urgent in Namibia in the first years of independence) 
and in preparing for any single negotiation.
Goals are, as discussed in the introduction, broader than 
fiscal and financial. They include economic control at 
micro (enterprise), sectoral (eg mining, finance) and macro 
(national) levels. These are not totally distinct - a very 
large enterprise such as CDM has major impact on GDP 
(national production), exports, tax revenue, domestic funds 
available for investment, wage policy, etc. Macro policy 
rests on sectoral, eg the ways in which national 
savings/surpluses are mobilised and allocated are both 
central to macro policy and a substantial component of 
financial institution sectoral policy. In addition to 
control development of citizen personnel and knowledge; 
diversification of production and of dependence on 
particular TNCs (eg if two more uranium oxide enterprises 
were to be established in Namibia as joint ventures with 
TNCs, a case could be made for picking partners without 
present major interests and from a country other than South 
Africa to reduce concentrated dependence on the Anglo-
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American/de Beers group); creation of fadeout provisions for
increasing national involvement in all aspects of an
enterprise (including ownership) and phasing out (or at
least down) TNC participation are likely to be major goals.
Indirect fiscal and financial goals include - and in respect 
to new enterprises are often dominated by - infrastructure 
issues. If infrastructure is created primarily for an 
enterprise/project the overall fiscal/financial evaluation 
of the project should include the infrastructure. A tax and 
dividend gain of $50 mn a year on a mine cannot be viewed as 
attractive if interest and debt service on power, transport 
and water facilities for it are $100 mn a year of which only 
$15 mn is covered by sales to the mine and $5 mn by sales to 
third parties. However, it is also possible for enterprises 
to provide indirect benefits by improving the sales and 
financial flows of existing infrastructure and/or fully 
covering the cost (including debt service) of new 
infrastructure which has additional financially viable 
secondary purchasers of services. Enterprises generate some 
local purchases - including by their employees - albeit 
unless rigorously quantified (and in respect to the 
enterprise itself backed by specific contractural 
provisions) not too much confidence should be placed on 
indirect tax and enterprise surplus gains under this head.
One specific 'indirect' issue is where the enterprise banks. 
If it deposits almost all its proceeds and pays almost all 
its bills and dividends with a bank in the host country (as, 
it would appear, none of the three major mining enterprises 
in Namibia do today), this maximises the domestic surpluses 
mobilised for use via the banking system, the overall 
foreign exchange reserves of the country and the general 
volume of banking business. (Or, to be more exact, it does 
so as long as, on balance, the enterprises are in cash flow 
surplus.) All of these are desirable and can be achieved by 
limitations on enterprise operations of external accounts - 
whether via general exchange control regulations or specific 
negotiations.
Direct fiscal and financial goals relate to the sum of 
taxation of the enterprise and its employees plus dividends 
(and interest if a state loan is involved) . Evidently the 
sum needs to be related to how much state capital is 
required, how stable the revenue flow will be, how the state 
and TNC shares compare, etc. But the key issue - at least 
from a state fiscal/financial viewpoint - is how much, not 
what the individual components of the total are. Different 
ways of raising, and different incentive offsets lowering, 
projected future revenue are important as they interact, not 
in isolation - a fact both state and TNC negotiators often 
appear to overlook.
Because goals flow from basic national policy and because a 
balance among a variety of goals is needed for efficient
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results from negotiation, goal articulation and approval 
requires both coordination and political involvement. Both 
an overall position on broad goals and a final pre­
negotiation detailed articulation of goals (and targets) 
should have cabinet level approval. This applies both prior 
to any overall negotiation/renegotiation programme and for 
any single negotiation which is large enough to be of 
national importance. By the same token, final contracts and 
related commitments should require cabinet level approval 
prior to ratification. For any one negotiation there needs 
to be a focal or co-ordinating ministry or department (which 
might be mines for minerals, finance for banks, etc., or 
might be finance or economic affairs for all cases if a 
special unit were set up for that purpose) . To ensure a 
comprehensive, balanced, technically sound approach however, 
a team is needed. For example for a major mine it would
probably involve finance, economic affairs, mining, state 
mining corporation, central bank, attorney general's and 
personpower (manpower) development. Advice from bodies with 
specific concerns (eg health on safety and medical
facilities, labour on union rights and working conditions, 
power and water corporation and water and power demand and 
pricing) is needed but broadening the basic team beyond a
core group will make it unwieldy. In renegotiation
employees (unions) are certainly a special concern body to 
be consulted and may be an appropriate core team member.
Data Collection and Analysis
Realistically in most negotiations, and many renegotiations, 
the initial detailed proposal, the basic data and the draft 
agreements come from the TNC side. This is not surprising 
as it - presumably - knows its own business, has a more
limited set of goals and usually has far more analytical and 
legal capacity available than does the state. However, it 
poses a problem: to negotiate on TNC decided data, within
the format of TNC developed proposals and inside the
framework of TNC drafted contracts is likely to produce a 
result skewed in favour of the TNC, not one evenly balanced 
or particularly favourable to the state. For example the
results of starting tax negotiations from a proposal which 
eliminates all import duties, exempts all expatriates of 
income tax, allows 50 per cent initial allowance and 100 per 
cent depreciation over two years, exempts dividends from 
withholding tax and makes all profits free of company tax
for ten years are likely to be quite different from those 
starting from a normal tax regime (perhaps including excess 
profits tax) and discussing what exemptions or concessions, 
if any, might be acceptable.
Therefore, it is critical that the state side:
(a) check all data provided by the TNC;
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(b) acquire additional and cross-check data 
independently of the TNC (as well as asking for 
more data);
(c) analyse the data within a set of parameters 
embodying national objectives;
(d) test what different changes in the terms of the 
agreement would produce in respect to results - eg 
as to net tax and dividend revenues;
(e) develop alternative wording for key contract 
clauses as well as acquiring expert 
interpretations of the meaning of initial and 
alternative wordings.
Among the fiscal and financial instruments usable are: 
basic company tax, royalties on output (unusual outside the 
mineral sector albeit they are worth consideration in 
respect of fishing), excess profits tax (eg a rate of 75 per 
cent on profits above a level providing 25 per cent after 
tax on net worth) , withholding tax on dividends and on fees 
payable for technical-managerial-marketing services, 
indirect taxes on plant-machinery-inputs) land rents, local 
rates, miscellaneous taxes, income taxes on expatriate 
personnel (many of whom are on contracts specifying their 
after tax income) , dividends, interest (on loans from the 
state). As noted, the net total is usually more critical 
than the structure - indeed a large number of charges many 
of which are small and uncertain is likely to be less 
productive than fewer, more clearly defined charges. 
Further, the interaction of taxes/dividends makes it 
critical to test the actual results of proposed changes by 
calculation since they are often not obvious. The tax base 
is often as important as rates, eg whether an initial 
allowance is granted on capital investment and over how many 
years fixed assets are depreciated. So too is ensuring that 
revenue is brought to book, ie providing some basis for 
determining that sales are made at reasonable prices (not 25 
per cent below market to TNC affiliates) and do cover all 
items transferred (not always true of secondary metals in 
concentrate sales) .
In the initial stages of building up negotiating expertise 
and experience, most countries have found it useful to 
employ expatriates to supplement citizen data collection and 
analysis personnel. In respect to highly technical and 
specialised data and analysis, a small country will probably 
need to hire specialised assistance for the foreseeable 
future - as do TNCs on specialised engineering, legal and 
local context issues. Where to hire is a complex question - 
international agencies (eg the Technical Assistance Group of 
the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations' 
Transnational Centre), specialised consultancy firms, 
merchant bankers and individual consultants are all
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appropriate at times. What matters most is a combination of 
relevant expertise and experience combined with high 
standards of professional loyalty to clients. (For actual 
members of the state's institutions some commitment to the 
country and its goals is also highly desirable.) Good 
consultancy costs money - sometimes over $1,000 a day per 
expert - not having it can cost more. Evaluating what is 
needed and the most cost effective way of getting it is an 
important aspect of preparing for negotiations. Both 
because of the cost of hired consultancy services and, even 
more because the core team are necessarily acting on 
critical, sensitive, national political economic issues, 
citizens should be involved in data collection and analysis 
from the start and building a basically citizen core team 
should be a priority in personpower development.
Target Selection and Tactics
The interim (pre actual negotiation) product of data 
collection and analysis is a set of national targets and 
instruments (eg taxes, ownership share, board members) for 
achieving them. These cannot usefully be seen either as the 
'minimum acceptable' or as a 'take it or leave it' offer.
What should be done probabaly involves:
(a) working out a 'minimal acceptable' package (if not 
attained, no deal);
(b) estimating what the TNC's minimum (without which
it really will not conclude an agreement) is;
(c) devising initial testing targets to define more
clearly what the limits of (b) are as, on 
occasion, a TNC will yield more than state 
negotiators expected.
It is usually useful to conduct an initial fairly rough run 
through of the entire set of proposals without making
definite agreements on any point. This approach can:
clarify facts and meanings, identify areas of basic
agreement and serious disagreement; indicate which points 
seem most critical and which most negotiable to the TNC.
Actual detailed negotiation is not a science but a number of 
general principles apply:
(a) initial offers or counterproposals will be debated
so some leeway should be left by the state (and 
usually is by the TNC) for bargaining;
(b) when a particular topic matters to the state more
than to the TNC it is worth pushing (and vice 
versa);
- 47 -
(c) in the presence of a probable bluff (eg a threat 
to break off negotiations permanently which seems 
unlikely to be true) a counterbluff is often good 
tactics;
(d) make progress on at least some points - especially 
if one or two key issues are deadlocked and have 
to be set aside - or adjourn for a day or a 
month's reflection?
(e) avoid open debate within the state team in the 
presence of the TNC (apparently obvious but a 
common error);
(f) beyond formal greeting, ministers should usually 
not be brought in until officials have gone as far 
as they can and only a handful of clearcut, major 
issues remain. For one thing ministerial time (to 
study detail or to negotiate) is limited and for 
another, if one wishes to change tactics or 
retreat from a mistaken offer, it is easier if 
senior ministers have not been personally and 
openly involved.
Diamond Marketing as a Case for Negotiation
Diamond marketing is critical to Namibia because in normal 
years about $500 mn of exports and over $300 mn of pre-tax 
surplus are generated by the diamond sector. Both are 
dependent on competent overseas marketing services and 
payment of an appropriate price (international wholesale 
less a reasonable marketing margin) to the Namibian 
producer.
The main Namibian goals in respect to diamond marketing are 
presumably to enhance export earnings and mine pre-tax 
surpluses (a major base for tax and dividend revenues). How 
to achieve this depends on marketing channels selected, 
charges accepted for services, influence on level of 
(Namibian) sales, independent checks on quality and value of 
stones sold.
Preliminary Data and Analysis
Diamonds are a special case of TNC mining activity, mainly 
because of the unique marketing arrangements available 
through De Beers' Central Selling Organisation (CSO). The 
discovery and mining of diamonds is itself specialised,
requiring the skills initially only available from TNCs,
followed by a long period of skill acquisition by local
personnel. In this, however, diamond mining is similar in
principle to the mining of other minerals. To date, one
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large diamond mine in Africa - Williamson's in Tanzania as a 
result of an intensive 1961-74 programme - has been 100 per 
cent citizenised.
In marketing, however, De Beers runs the world's only quasi­
successful commodity buffer stock. For 60 years the CSO has 
bought about 80 per cent of world output of gem diamonds 
into the buffer stock, and sold from it in such a way as to 
maintain a fixed price in the short run, with periodic 
rises. The agreements between the CSO and producers also 
allow for reductions in CSO purchases if required by market 
conditions. Producers then have the choice between
maintaining output to be stockpiled nationally, on the one 
hand, and reducing production, and probably employment as 
well, on the other hand.
In the current recession, producers have had to cut back in 
this way. CSO sales fell from $2.8 bn in 1980 to $1.5 bn in 
1981 and $1.3 bn in 1982. While the CSO did build up its 
stockpile of diamonds, producers were also forced to
stockpile or reduce output, or both. For example, 
Botswana's sales of diamonds to the CSO fell in 1981 to only 
57 per cent of the 1980 figure; during one three-month
period, no sales to the CSO took place at all, forcing the 
country to stockpile all of its output during that time. 
CDM cut output from two million carats in the late 1970s to 
1 mn in 1982.
So the CSO marketing arrangement is part buffer stock and
part producers' cartel. It is different from the commodity 
buffer stock proposals put forward as part of the New
International Economic Order, in that it is run by a private
company for private profit. The company in question is also
a major producer of diamonds. The question thus arises as
to whether or not De Beers runs the CSO in a way that meets
the interests of the other producers.
The De Beers near-monopoly of the market in rough diamonds 
clearly requires that the greater part of mine production be 
sold to the CSO in order for the CSO to be able to control 
prices. So the deal offered by the CSO to independent
producers has to remain more attractive than any alternative
marketing arrangement available, in order to prevent 
producers from choosing alternative marketing arrangements.
Some host country governments may at times be more
interested in short term price rises than in the long term
control of prices, especially where a diamond mine has a 
relatively short remaining life. In general, however, all 
producers have an interest in market stability even from a 
short run point of view. The recent (1981/82) crisis was 
mainly caused by too rapid a rise in diamond prices in the 
preceding years, a speculative boom which was bound to be 
followed by a relapse. This suggests that short term gains 
can quickly lead to losses, with the risk of a prolonged 
loss of market control and lower prices.
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The evidence is fairly strong that some sort of buffer stock 
or cartel arrangement is necessary if gem diamond production 
is to remain profitable. Gem diamonds are inherently 
useless objects, which are bought (a) because they are 
pretty, and (b) because prices have been maintained for so 
long. There are many competing pretty objects, but few 
whose real value has been maintained consistently for so 
long, and whose price has increased faster than inflation 
for long periods. Any loss of confidence in the long-term 
continuation of this market control, could sharply reduce 
the attraction of gem diamonds to final buyers.
Nevertheless, producing countries are bound to be concerned 
about the fact that the CSO is dominated by a South African 
based company of great wealth and power with a predilection 
for great secrecy. The CSO reveals very little about 
itself; it charges a substantial commission on sales; it has 
a larger annual sales volume than the GDPs of small 
countries such as Botswana and Namibia, which is bound to 
create fear of an unequal bargaining situation; and it 
allows no producer participation at all in its marketing and 
other decisions.
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Chapter Five
TAXATION AND PARTICIPATION OPTIONS IN NAMIBIA: SECTORAL
NOTES ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Introduction
The following notes are not comprehensive: adequate data do
not exist to conduct such an exercise even if space 
permitted. Nor do they constitute either hard and fast 
recommendations or an agenda for action. Until the 
constitutional assembly and the government of independent 
Namibia have had time and space to set out their goals more 
completely, and in consultation with Namibians in Namibia, 
such an exercise would be rather presumptuous. In any 
event, even were SWAPO in a position to make a definitive 
detailed statement on which TNCs it wished to negotiate 
with, in which sectors, for what purposes and under what 
terms and conditions, it would hardly be in SWAPO1s interest 
to do so. To lay one's bargaining hand face up on the table 
months or years before negotiations can begin (as opposed to 
indicating its broad outlines) is rarely a sound negotiating 
tactic.
However, we feel that data on the Namibian policy and on 
TNCs in Namibia as well as SWAPO's policy statements do 
allow us to identify key sectors and issues, for 
consideration in working out a strategy for independent 
Namibia. While neither complete nor definitive, they may 
provide the outline of an agenda for reflection and 
articulation.
Some General Points
Fiscal and financial negotiations are enhanced by having a 
sound basic tax system, including - where appropriate - 
special provisions by sector (eg mining, hydrocarbons), and 
power for the Minister for Finance to issue special
exemptions or enhancements when he deems them to be in the
public interest. Among the elements of such a system are:
(a) a basic company tax (say at 50 cent of 
profits) ?
(b) with a reasonable depreciation schedule (say 3-5 
years for vehicles, 5 to 10 years for plant and
machinery and 20-30 for buildings and civil
engineering);
(c) perhaps with provisions for initial allowances 
('extra' depreciation, ie a tax waiver of 50 per 
cent of the allowance) issuable at the state's 
option when specified conditions are met;
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(d) a withholding tax covering all external payments 
of dividends, interest, royalties, rentals, 
management and technical fees and similar items 
(perhaps at half the company tax rate or over a 
range from a quarter to a half) ;
(e) a progressive personal income tax applying to all 
income earned/received in respect to employment in 
Namibia wherever and by whomever paid (with 
provisions for exemptions, eg in respect to grant 
funded technical assistance personnel);
(f) a coherent set of import duties (basically for
protection or as a deterrent to the use of foreign 
exchange) and of sales taxes (on imports and
domestic product - designed primarily to raise 
revenue) with no automatic zero rates for capital 
goods or enterprise operating imports, but with 
the possibility of exemptions;
(g) a minimum number of nuisance (to both the
collector and the payer) taxes such as stamp duty 
on cheques or authorised capital;
(h) perhaps selective royalties (rents related to
extraction) for the use of natural resources (eg 
minerals, fish, trees, perhaps water);
(i) arrangements allowing for additional profits taxes
or analagous quasi-royalty arrangements to capture 
the bulk of the rent element and of genuinely 
windfall gains, eg from major oil discoveries,
metal price booms or monopolistic marketing 
positions.
The value of a general system -with special provisions for
unusual sectors - is to have a clear starting point (and one
yielding substantial revenue) for negotiations and an
understandable (to TNCs and to Namibia) fiscal strategy. 
The value of the power to make exemptions - or enhancements 
- is that, in the case of large projects and enterprises, it 
is often necessary to bargain on the exact levels and makeup 
of fiscal charges, to achieve an acceptable TNC DCF and an 
acceptable national DCF and net revenue flow.
Two related issues are determining accuracy of books and 
appropriateness of prices paid/received in external 
transactions. As suggested earlier, a domestic (ideally 
public sector since any other would in practice be a TNC 
branch) audit corporation, as auditor for major enterprise 
books, could help on the first point and various special 
mechanisms, including, perhaps, a metal marketing enterprise 
and a diamond rating and valuation office, could contribute 
on the second.
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Other aspects are sectoral or sub-sectoral. The most 
critical sectors in respect to possible TNC involvement, 
negotiation and renegotiation are likely to be mining, 
banking and finance, manufacturing (including meat and fish 
processing), petroleum importation and distribution and 
general external trade.
Mining
This sector is critical because in a normal year it can 
generate $800-1,000 mn of exports and $400-500 mn of pre-tax 
investible surplus. Thus the basic foreign balance, 
domestic investible resources and tax base of independent 
Namibia will be dependent on it. Further, the sector has 
both relatively good medium term prospects for expansion and 
a need to reinvest, explore and open new enterprises to 
avoid going into decline. Substantial numbers of skilled, 
professional and managerial personnel are required (today 99 
per cent European) as is a significant body of technical 
knowledge. Exploration is expensive and bringing new 
projects into production very expensive indeed (up to the 
$1,500 mn level). Profits - on average -have been high but 
are very unstable from year to year and, at least in base
metals, consecutive years of pre-tax deficits are real
possibilities (eg Tsumeb 1981-82). Past taxes have been low
and (South African) state participation fairly low.
This background suggests several major initial targets:
(a) maintenance of output;
(b) reinvestment, exploration and development to 
sustain and expand future output;
(c) training of Namibian personnel to fill skilled, 
professional and managerial posts;
(d) maintenance (and future expansion) of operating 
profit;
(e) expansion of the state's share in profits from 
taxes and participation in ownership;
(f) buildup of a significant state ownership position
probably either through joint ventures or 
through selective acquisition of 100 per cent 
ownership initially with a TNC hired as a contract 
manager;
(g) initial concentration on renegotiation in respect
to the three dominant mining enterprises - CDM,
Rossing, Tsumeb - phasing into negotiations on new
projects (or explorations);
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(h) nationalisation of all mineral rights and 
renegotiation of allocations of rights to extract 
to companies;
(i) developing technical capabilities (in a Ministry
of Mines and, probably, a state mining enterprise) 
in respect to geological survey and evaluation,
project analysis and valuation of mineral, 
concentrate and metal exports.
In respect to base metals the problem of whether or not to 
institute substantial royalties needs attention. Because 
profits vary sharply (and in some years are negative) 
royalties would tend to stabilise state revenue. But to do 
so significantly, they would need to be 15-20 per cent of 
gross sales which would almost certainly deter mining of 
lower grade ore and could lead to premature abandoning of 
existing mines, and of negotiations for new mines. A
stronger case exists for additional profits taxes to capture 
the rent element in high profits. However, for enterprise 
DCF to remain attractive in cyclical mines 'standard rate' 
profit not earned in bad years may need to be 'carried 
forward' as earnable in subsequent good years.
A new tax/participation arrangement with the dominant 
company - Tsumeb - would need to be negotiated. A key issue 
would be guarantees as to exploration and new (replacement) 
mine development - probably desired by Anglo as well as in 
Namibia's interests. A special problem may be Otjihase mine 
- now part of Tsumeb - which is a post 1966 mine, ie 
established without any agreement between the TNC 
(Johannesburg Consolidated) and any body with inernationally 
recognised de jure authority over Namibia.
The minor mines in the sector are not individually critical. 
Some - eg SWACO (also ultimately Anglo) - might be 
renegotiated, with conditions on exploration and 
development, either with present owners or new external 
ownership and/or technical partners. Presumably the
presently RSA state owned mines and the other post-1966 mine 
(Oamites - formerly Falconbridge Nickel) will need new 
arrangements including at least managerial and technical 
partners.
Uranium consists of one major (and highly profitable) 
company (Rossing), one partly developed project (Langer 
Heinrich) and three relatively proven deposits. The 
immediate concern is Rossing. Presumably the RSA minority 
equity stake (which, however, appears to hold major voting 
power) will be acquired by Namibia. Because Rossing is a 
(one might almost say the) post 1966 mine, but one Namibia 
could not begin to operate itself, decisions on how to 
approach overall ownership and management are crucial. The 
options are renegotiation with RTZ (present majority 
shareholder and operator); ousting RTZ and securing a new 
ownership partner; ousting RTZ and arranging a management 
and technical contract.
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Because Rossing's capital has been fully recovered and its 
profits are likely to remain high, a case exists for some 
form of additional profits tax - say on past normal company 
tax, profits in excess of 25 per cent of the historic (or 15 
per cent of the depreciated replacement) value of net assets 
employed.
How to sell uranium and to whom is both a revenue and a
geopolitical question. Term contracts to major electricity 
producers will probably yield the most predictable and
stable profits. Spot market sales will maximise profit in 
good years and minimise it or may lead to losses in bad 
years. Specialised expert advice on the approach to be used 
- which might be a mixed one with a base of term contracts
and the balance sold spot - will be needed. Selling openly
to commercial (not military or quasi-military) users may be 
important to Namibia to avoid the suspicion that tends to 
surround uranium oxide producers whose sales patterns are 
not open to inspection.
A serious review of how and when to proceed, on which
additional uranium ventures, is a matter of importance and 
some urgency. One - Langer Heinrich - is likely to be 
abandoned by its present owners (Gencor/Federale Mynbou).
At least one is likely to be promoted by its discoverers 
(led by Anglo who have taken care not to develop it before 
independence) as soon as medium term uranium • oxide market 
prospects are firmer. Namibia needs to be able to take a 
reasoned view of the sub-sector, not negotiate piecemeal on 
individual proposals.
Diamonds are CDM. Here the recent Jwaneng negotiations in 
Botswana suggest that very major tax, participation, 
personnel and local purchase gains can be achieved. The
problem is to negotiate carefully to achieve the best
possible deal - not just one significantly better than at
present. Diamonds have stable enough and high enough
profits to make a royalty's negative impact on production 
fairly low - but also to raise doubts as to how much it
really would stabilise revenue. As with uranium and base 
metals, an additional profits tax or rent resource tax seems 
indicated. Further exploration and development of the 
apparent upstream discoveries to sustain output in the 1.5- 
2.0 mn carat range, beyond the end of the century, is an
item which should be on the renegotiation agenda. The case 
for and against the continued use of the CSO - but on 
renegotiated terms and with independent sorting/valuation - 
needs to be thoroughly evaluated.
Coal requires the building up of a Namibian data base on how 
to tackle the sector. At least 100,000 tonnes have a 
domestic market if they can be transported at reasonable 
cost. When the Botnam (Trans Kalahari) railway is built 
presumably either Arandis or Aranos coal could be 
economically carried to it on a branch line for export. The
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volume and economics of either of these options or of a 
combination, require study. A TNC is unlikely to be 
interested in or - as an equity partner necessary for - the 
domestic project, albeit Tsumeb as a major user might be 
interested in acting as a manager. For a large (2.5 to 5.0 
million tonne) export oriented mine at least a managerial, 
technical, marketing partner would be required.
A related issue concerns the Trans Kalahari railway itself. 
If Shell is to be involved in its finance and operation from 
the Botswana colliery to the sea, then negotiations between 
Namibia and Shell on route, Namibian investment required (if 
any) , control over traffic regulation and tariffs for non- 
Botswana (Shellcoal) cargoes, personnel development, etc. 
will be a matter of urgency. In this respect a coordinated 
position with that of Botswana would appear to be critical.
There are two known liguid and gaseous hydrocarbon prospects 
in Namibia. Neither is within years or, probably, scores of 
millions of dollars of being commercially proven, but both 
may attract TNC interest once Namibia is independent. To
negotiate effectively Namibia will need far more data than 
it now has on either.
The first is the 'greater Etosha Basin' covering most of 
Northern Namibia (and part of Southern Angola). Evidence 
exists apparently justifying initial seismic surveys and - 
with luck - consequent drilling. The time span from initial 
seismic to even moderate (say one to two million tonnes a
year) production - asuuming success - could well be 10 years 
and the cost in excess of $500 mn. Here Namibia may wish to
seek to place exploration risk on TNCs and retain rights to
'buy in' at the development stage as well as to combine
royalties, profit tax and some form of additional profits 
tax to secure a substantial cash flow from any viable field 
and up to 90 per cent of profits from a major field.
Experience elsewhere suggests this is not impossible -albeit 
it may be very difficult until the oil market's future
prospects are clearer.
The second prospect is the offshore natural gas discoveries
roughly in the Oranjemund sub-oceanic delta. The fact that
South Africa ceased drilling after two gas finds strongly
suggests that oil prospects are not very bright. However, 
the gas may be commercially viable - proof would require 
additional drilling. Unless a very large field (say five to 
eight trillion cubic feet) suitable for liquified natural 
gas production (which would require $5,000-8,000 mn 
investment) is proven, the plausible uses are ammonia-urea, 
methanol and power production. At present, hydroelectric 
power would appear likely to be more economical for Namibia 
and the methanol market is highly uncertain. If field 
viability is proven - perhaps using soft loans from an
international agency convertible into harder ones only when
and if commercial production exists -detailed analysis to
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choose a product and a technical-managerial-marketing 
partner (almost certainly a TNC) would be required. Overall 
field and plant plus infrastructure cost would probably be 
of the order of $1,000 mn.
Banking and Finance
Much of this sector is unsuitable for (eg Central Bank) or 
unattractive to (eg rural, housing, small business term 
lending) TNCs. Another portion (eg investment bank lending 
to medium and large enterprises) can be organised with TNCs 
or - perhaps more plausibly - with national and 
international development agencies (eg Commonwealth 
Development Corporation, Germany's KFW, SIDA, World Bank). 
At one level this suggests that the main area of concern is 
commercial banking and at another that very substantial 
calls on Namibian personnel (plus directly recruited and 
technical assistance expatriates), finance and
institutional/managerial capacity will be required in 
aspects of the financial sector for which TNC involvement is 
not a live option.
As discussed earlier, the primary importance of the 
financial sector lies in its role in collecting/mobilising 
and lending/allocating savings (surplus). It is also 
critical to controlling the external balance. In addition 
it does generate substantial surpluses itself (and can on 
occasion make substantial losses). Thus the probable goals 
in relation to this sector - and to any TNC involvement in 
commercial banking - turn on effective macro, sectoral and 
microeconomic management with special reference to 
mobilisation, allocation and control of overall savings and 
domestic credit levels and to managing external transactions 
and reserves. Direct public sector revenue - from taxation 
and/or participation - is a significant but, probably, in 
this sector secondary goal. Personnel development is both 
part of a general economy-wide goal and a means to 
increasing sectoral efficiency and the capacity of Namibians 
to maintain and increase that efficiency themselves.
The commercial banking subsector is dominated by Barclays 
and Standard. The other TNC bank (Dresdner), the Afrikaaner 
banks and the quasi-local bank are peripheral.
The main issues in negotiation/renegotiation are likely to
include:
(a) maintaining a smoothly operating commercial
banking system and expanding its operations in
rural areas;
(b) accepting broad policy direction and professional
regulation by the Central Bank;
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(c) incorporation of Namibian business as Namibian 
companies with substantial equity capital and 
relating to the London - not Johannesburg - head 
offices;
(d) development of personnel training and promotion 
programmes for Namibians on an acceptable scale 
and at an acceptable pace;
(e) serious efforts to develop access for African 
businessmen with sound prospects to credit and to 
financial advice;
(f) cooperation in the physical operation of exchange 
control - including limits on bank balances 
abroad;
(g) ending the present placing of balances at no or 
negligible interest with head offices and the 
payment of large, non-detailed head office expense 
contributions which appear to reduce taxable 
profit in Namibia by up to 75 per cent;
(h) exploring the desirability and timing of
government equity participation of the order of 
50-60 per cent and of merger of the Namibian 
operations of Barclays and Standard.
Evidence elsewhere in Africa since 1970 suggests that very 
substantial gains could be achieved in negotiations on this 
list.
The establishment of a state owned commercial bank requires 
further study:
(a) it is hard to see how it could contribute very
much to attaining key sectoral goals in under five
years although it might have greater long term
importance;
(b) to be effective from establishment it would almost 
certainly need to have a TNC bank minority partner
possibly one with African experience but no 
prior Namibian legacy, eg Bank of America, 
National and Grindlays, Nederland Algemene;
(c) it would require substantial government allocation 
of personnel, policy attention, finance and 
business to become significant and would, 
initially, have relatively low profits.
In the field of insurance there are not enough data to 
analyse the sub-sector. However, one evident goal is to 
limit the outflow of funds. This might involve:
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(a) requiring existing companies to match Namibian
assets and liabilites (especially in respect to 
life insurance);
(b) creating a state owned (or majority owned)
insurance corporation with technical, managerial 
and perhaps minority equity participation by an 
international insurance broker or an established 
national insurance corporation (eg India or
Tanzania);
(c) once the national corporation had built up its
capacity (and citizen staff and agents) and the 
government had more data on the sector, consider 
giving the company a monopoly in some lines of 
insurance.
Manufacturing
Manufacturing is a rather non-homogeneous sector. Three 
sub-sectors are pre-export processing (primarily of meat and 
fish), local market oriented production and regional market 
related manufacturing. Goals include structural
diversification, increases in foreign exchange earnings, 
enhancing exports and increasing Namibian middle and high 
level personnel development. A special goal is maintaining 
the viability of the ranching sector. Major tax or profit 
revenues in the short run appear unlikely.
Only enterprises which are large by Namibian standards will 
be of interest to TNCs. Equally, probably they will be the 
only ones in which open market purchase of technology, 
securing of initial expatriates directly or through a 
technical assistance agency, and fairly rapid 
Namibianisation, pose major problems.
Meat packing, freezing and tinning and fish processing (meal 
and oil), tinning and freezing are the main pre-export 
processing industries. Without them the continued existence 
of the beef ranching and fishing sectors would be placed in 
jeopardy. Profit levels - especially soon after
independence - are likely to be modest. Existing owners 
(with the new French-ENOK meat packing joint venture an 
exception) are not TNCs but South African corporations whose 
continued presence after independence is very problematic.
In respect to meat packing and freezing adequate capacity to 
handle probable Namibian offtake to - say - the early 1990s 
exists. The problem is identifying partners (technical or 
ownership) with operating and export competence on terms 
which do not impose undue financial burdens on either the 
budget or the ranching sector. Possibilities include a TNC
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not previously involved and a national meat packer (eg that 
of Botswana) . A subsequent possibility for a TNC or joint 
venture project would be tanning of leather and (later) 
production of shoes from hides and skins rather than
exporting them raw.
The fish tinning and processing situation at first glance 
appears comparable to that in respect to meat. Indeed the 
first order difference is vast overcapacity. If, however, 
South Africa remains in occupation of Walvis Bay (site of 
all but one plant) , revival of the Namibian industry will 
require a new plant. Potential partners - including in
marketing - need further exploration with Scandinavian and 
Peruvian firms possible alternatives to the better known
TNCs.
A related venture is Metal Box's currently closed tin (can) 
plant at Walvis Bay. Its reopening (or, as with fish 
processing, creation of a new plant) may be important if 
South African supplies cannot be depended on. An
interruption in supply would have catastrophic effects on 
meat and fish tinning enterprises. The evident owner or 
partner - partly because international acceptability of tins 
is critical - is Metal Box. However, as the project is not 
likely to have a high DCF (except at prices crippling the
users) a technical/managerial contract with Metal Box, or 
another major tin manufacturer for a state owned plant, may 
be the only practicable alternative to importation with its 
risks of supply interruption.
Much more data are needed to allow serious analysis of what 
substantial domestic market industries would have plausible 
DCFs or net contributions to GDP. The same applies to 
whether TNC ownership or participation would be practicable, 
necessary and/or attractive. The main short term target 
therefore is data collection and analysis - presumably in a 
Namibian institution, initially using expatriate experts 
while training Namibians both in formal courses and on the 
job.
A possible exception is cement. A five year old study, by a 
South African firm, apparently showed an attractive DCF; and 
the political risk of non-implementation, which would mean 
continued dependence on imports, was considered high. 
Because the ratio of actual to capacity output is highly 
dependent on artisanal and managerial capacity, early 
establishment of a cement plant would probably best be done 
via the joint venture route, with a firm (not necessarily 
North Atlantic or Japanese) with substantial experience in 
producing in the tropics. However, if - as anticipated - 
Angola develops substantial low cost cement exports the 
priority for (as well as the DCF on) a Namibian plant would 
require reexamination before a firm decision is taken. 
Similarly the potential for sales to Botswana should be 
explored since cement has substantial economies of scale up
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to a size beyond Namibian demand and, when the Trans-
Kalahari is built, a 200-400,000 tonne Namibian plant might 
be competitive in Botswana.
Another probable exception is light engineering including 
machinery and vehicle maintenance, assembly and spares 
production. Presumably the present degree of dependence on 
South Africa will be seen as economically as well as
politically imprudent after independence. What expertise
exists in Namibia is largely related to mining and is held 
by settler or mining firms. Because of the small size of 
individual projects, TNCs are unlikely to find the sector 
attractive. Options which might be explored are branches of 
(or joint ventures with) Zimbabwe enterprises, involvement 
of mining companies in maintenance and other activities for 
sale as well as for own use, technical or ownership
partnerships with vehicle manufacturers (perhaps tied to 
standardisation of vehicle types imported), and 
collaboration with Scandinavian small scale industries 
backed by Nordic assistance.
The same considerations apply to regional as to domestic 
market manufacturing. In addition, account would have to be 
paid to the state of SADCC (Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference) industrial and trade sector 
coordination and forward planning at the time of Namibia's 
independence.
Petroleum
The goal in this sector is to ensure continued supply at 
import and internal distribution levels of petroleum 
products and to do so at the minimum possible cost 
(especially foreign exchange cost). The present system is 
dominated by South African subsidiaries of TNCs using high 
cost South African refined products sources which - on
experience elsewhere in the region - would be subject to
delays and interruptions after independence.
There is no technical reason why a state petroleum products 
purchasing and importing company (buying on the spot market 
or - say - by contract with Angola) plus one or two joint 
venture distribution firms (possibly with TNCs, like AGIP, 
with African experience but no Namibian legacy) could not be 
created. However, experience in Tanzania suggests that this 
approach - while profitable - takes time to build up a
smooth operation and demands substantial working capital, 
personnel and policy attention. Thus it might be seen by
Namibia as a medium rather than a short term approach.
In that case negotiations with one or more existing 
distributors (say Shell and BP) might turn on:
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(a) incorporation of Namibian subsidiaries relating to 
London or The Hague, not Johannesburg;
(b) sourcing imports from non-South African refineries 
at prices which could be demonstrated to be 
competitive;
(c) retaining a government right to supply refined 
products imports, if it could negotiate medium 
term contracts at prices or on terms the TNCs 
refused to match;
(d) requiring major personnel development programmes;
(e) increasing storage capacity (and replacing the 
existing capacity of Walvis Bay at a new port if 
South Africa continues to occupy Walvis Bay).
There is no economic case for a refinery for Namibia alone. 
If a joint Namibia-Botswana-Zimbabwe refinery project 
(presumably with a technical and perhaps ownership partner 
such as ENI of Italy or the Angolan or Brazilian state oil 
companies) proved negotiable an attractive DCF might be 
achieved. Otherwise coordination with Angola - perhaps 
minority participation in an Angolan refinery - would seem 
likely to prove more prudent.
External Trade
Exporting has in fact been covered in relation to mining and 
manufacturing with the exception of karakul and wool. In 
the case of karakul the pre-export processing is negligible, 
the Namibian based marketing cooperative is a settler body 
and the near monopoly export buyer (Hudson's Bay) has 
disastrously failed in effective promotion of karakul 
resulting in both volume and price falls. Data and analysis 
toward a potential replacement structure - presumably 
involving a firm with comparable trade experience at the 
international marketing level - is the immediate requirement 
and one which needs to be completed prior to independence.
In respect to imports a rather different situation pertains. 
As a result of the common tariff area with South Africa, 
various administrative arrangements and the highly 
oligopolised nature of South African business, over 60 per 
cent of Namibia's imports are from, and perhaps 90 per cent 
via, South Africa. Very few (if any) Namibian import houses 
have the capacity to identify low cost supplies on a global 
basis as opposed to ordering from or via South Africa. From 
a Namibian perspective continuation of this pattern lacks 
economic (South Africa is not, in most cases, the lowest 
cost source) , geographic (Namibia has ports) and commercial
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(ie local value adding in importing/wholesaling) logic in 
addition to its defects of contributing to massive, 
unilateral dependence and creating opportunities for 
economic disruption.
The probable goal in relation to this sector is to secure
dependable, low cost, diversified sources of supply for 
major imports. The gains would accrue predominantly to 
users - including the state - rather than as importer
profits. The probable main revenue gain to the government 
would be that the lower the basic import cost, the higher 
the rate of indirect tax consistent with any level of user 
prices and therefore the easier to raise revenue without
injuring consumers' standards of living.
There is no way of creating capacity for global sourcing 
(buying from low cost sources wherever located) rapidly 
other than by involving a trading firm which already has 
that capacity. Probably such a firm would want a joint 
venture and accept a personnel training programme to ensure 
that it did receive enough business to make a significant 
profit. Probably two or three joint ventures (perhaps one
with the Scandinavian Wholesale Co-operative Federation or a
similar body, one with a European trading company and one
with a Japanese or South Korean trading house) would be
better than one, partly to ensure genuine global knowledge
and partly to encourage competition.
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Chapter Six
CONCLUSION
There are a number of reasons why states seek to negotiate 
with TNCs to establish, maintain or expand wholly owned or 
joint venture enterprises in their territories. Among the 
more important are fiscal and financial gains largely 
achieved through taxation and participation in ownership.
TNCs are interested in group survival, profitability and 
expansion. Their chief technique for evaluating proposed 
projects (including renegotiated present arrangements) is 
Discounted Cash Flow, that is the present value of their 
projected future net cash flows from the proposed project 
(or renegotiated contract or enterprise).
Because fiscal and financial issues turn on dividing the 
available surplus they necessarily involve conflicts of 
interest between TNCs and states. In principle agreement 
can be reached -at least in respect to fiscal and financial 
aspects - if, when minimum state fiscal and financial 
targets are met, the DCF to the TNC investor exceeds his 
cutoff rate. Similarly, in such a case, if the DCF to the 
investor is at his cutoff rate, then the fiscal/financial 
return to the state will exceed its minimum targets.
This suggests that at least so far as fiscal and financial 
aspects go, negotiations (from a state perspective) should 
have two phases:
(a) testing whether it appears likely that state and 
TNC minima can be met at the same time;
(b) seeking to push the TNC as close to its minimum as
possible ensuring the maximum share of
fiscal/financial surplus to the state.
This - like the previous paragraph - oversimplifies in that 
some fiscal/financial gains (or costs) to the state do not 
represent costs (gains) to the TNC and vice versa. 
Correction to take account of this may in any actual case 
make agreement more (if each side can achieve gains not 
viewed as costs by the other) or less (if costs to one not 
seen as gains to the other dominate) likely.
For negotiations to approximate this model, the state must 
determine its goals first, from that point articulate them 
both to sectors and the use of TNCs and finally to
particular project/enterprise cases. The process also 
requires adequate data and analysis to identify particular 
targets (in this case fiscal and financial) with instruments 
for achieving them in practice and tactics for achieving 
acceptance of the targets and/or instruments by the TNC 
negotiating party.
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Projects, enterprises, TNCs and negotiations need to be 
perceived together as well as individually. This is 
necessary to set priorities - whether for direct ownership 
and management without TNC involvement, for activities to be 
kept operating efficiently, or for trading off fiscal and 
financial benefits from using an already established TNC 
against diffusing dependence and perhaps increasing general 
bargaining strength by choosing one with no existing 
operation in Namibia. (The last of course requires knowing 
group memberships - substituting Minorco for Charter or De 
Beers or SWACO or Consolidated Goldfields or Tsumeb or 
Johannesburg Consolidated or CDM or Debswana or Anglo 
American is not diversification as all are among the major 
Anglo American group members.)
While it is premature to seek to identify all issues likely 
to arise in negotiations/renegotiations between independent 
Namibia and TNCs, enough is known to list a number of the 
key ones for major sectors and, in some cases, individual 
enterprises. Similarly, while it would be presumptuous for 
anyone at present to seek to specify the goals independent 
Namibia will adopt in great detail or completeness, SWAPO 
policy and strategy are clear enough to make certain broad 
identifications. In turn these give some indication of the 
alternative approaches to TNC negotiation/renegotiation 
likely to be seen by independent Namibia as worth serious 
consideration.
Because both the importance and characteristics of 
particular sectors vary, Namibia's goals in respect to them, 
its alternatives to TNCs as partial means to attaining the 
goals and the practicable parameters for
negotiation/renegotiation (perhaps especially in respect to 
financial and fiscal considerations) differ substantially 
from sector to sector and even within sectors. Among the 
sectors in which TNCs and negotiations with them are likely 
to be most important are mining, finance (commercial 
banking), pre-export processing (and export marketing) and 
importing. The notes presented above do not purport to be 
either a summary of any existing Namibian position or a set 
of recommendations. They are a possible outline of an 
agenda for Namibian dialogue, not an agenda for action 
through literal translation into negotiation.
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